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COMMENT
TOWARD A CONSISTENT RECOGNITION
OF THE FORBIDDEN INFERENCE:
THE ILLINOIS RAPE SHIELD
STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
Since want of consent on the part of the complainant is of the
essence of the crime of forcible rape .... it is permissible, in order to
show the probability of consent by the prosecutrix, that her general
reputation for immorality and unchastity be shown. The underlying
thought here is that it is more probable that an unchaste woman would
assent to such an act than a virtuous woman ....
This view reflected the prevailing attitude of many courts to-
ward complainants2 in sexual offense3 trials prior to the reform
movement in the 1970s to protect these alleged sexual assault vic-
tims.4 The theory that disclosure of a woman's sexual past was nec-
essary to determine whether she was victimized by the defendant
was empowered by two stereotypes. First, the stereotypically un-
I People v. Collins, 186 N.E.2d 30, 33 (Ill. 1962).
2 This comment will refer to the alleged victim of sexual assault as the "complain-
ant" or "alleged victim" in order to make no assumptions as to whether a sexual offense
was indeed perpetrated. However, in cases where the defendant has been convicted, or
in references to statistical data concerning sexual assaults, the term "victim" may be
used.
3 As the term "rape" is no longer found in Illinois sexual offense statutes, this com-
ment will refer to a case of sexual assault or sexual abuse as either a sexual offense or
sexual assault. However, reference to the statutes prohibiting disclosure of the sexual
history of the complainant will still be referred to as "rape shield" laws, due to the
almost universal adoption of this phrase.
4 For a discussion of the reform movement concerning sexual assault complainants
in the United States, see, inter alia, Harriet R. Galvin,'Shielding Rape Victims in the State and
Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 791-802 (1986);
Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tibulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 22-39 (1977); J. Alexander Tanford & Anthony J. Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield
Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 544, 551-56 (1980); Abraham P.
Ordover, Admissibility of Patterns of Similar Sexual Conduct: The Unlamented Death of Character
for Chastity, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 90, 95-102 (1977).
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chaste complainant, by nature of her "promiscuity," lacked credibil-
ity. Both judges and jurors were likely to consider such an alleged
victim as either unworthy of belief in general 5 or, more specifically,
likely to fabricate charges of sexual assault. 6 The second stereotype
regarding complainants was that a woman who has consented to
sexual activity on one occasion will always consent: "if she did it
once, she'd do it again."' 7
As a result of these views on women and sexual assault,8 de-
fense counsel often subjected the sexual offense complainant to a
detailed disclosure of her9 sexual history. 10 Defense counsel sought
to portray the alleged victim as a promiscuous woman who, by na-
ture of her previous sexual activity, likely consented to sexual con-
duct on the occasion in question.'1 This examination focused the
inquiry onto the actions of the alleged victim, rather than those of
the defendant. 12 As a result of this manipulation by defense coun-
sel, the proceeding shamed and humiliated the complainant and in-
creased the likelihood of the defendant's acquittal. 13 Further, the
fear of disclosure of their sexual history often discouraged sexual
assault victims from even reporting these attacks to the police.14
5 Galvin, supra note 4, at 787. Professor Galvin notes that the link between promis-
cuity and veracity was applicable only to women. Id.
6 Ordover, supra note 4, at 120-23; 3A J.WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 736 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
Dean Wigmore went so far as to suggest that "[n]o judge should ever let a sex offense
charge go to the jury unless the female complainant's social history and mental makeup
have been examined and testified to by a qualified physician." Id. at 737.
7 Berger, supra note 4, at 55.
8 Generalizations about women and sexual assault are by no means limited to the
issue of the woman's sexual history to prove consent. For a particularly compelling de-
piction of the stereotypical victim of sexual assault, see Sharon Maloney, Rape in Illinois:
A Denial of Equal Protection, 8 JOHN MARSHALLJ. PRAC. & PROC. 457, 469 (1975).
9 In this comment, for the sake of simplicity, the feminine gender will be used to
refer to the sexual offense complainant, and the male gender will be used to refer to the
sexual offense defendant. In some cases involving prior sexual history of the complain-
ant, only this male-female relationship would apply, e.g., evidence of the complainant's
pregnancy; in most instances, however, the discussion of the alleged victim's past sexual
conduct would apply equally to a male complainant.
10 Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 4, at 546-5 1; Richard A. Hibey, The Trial of a Rape
Case: An Advocate's Analysis of Corroboration, Consent, and Character, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
309 (1973); Berger, supra note 4, at 15-22.
11 Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 4, at 548. See S. MAXWELL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
248 (1896) (complainant's want of chastity increases likelihood of consent on particular
occasion).
12 James J. Wesoloski, Indicia of Consent? A Proposal for Change to the Common Law Rule
Admitting Evidence of a Rape Complainant's Characterfor Chastity, 7 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 118, 120
n.10 (1976) (complainant is victimized once again when trial begins); Ordover, supra
note 4, at 93 n.7 (1977).
13 Galvin, supra note 4, at 767 (1986); Berger, supra note 4, at 12-15.
14 A recent national study indicated that only 167o, or approximately one out of
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The Illinois General Assembly responded to these courtroom
attacks on alleged sexual assault victims in two ways. First, it re-
formed Illinois' sexual offense laws' 5 to detract attention from the
complainant's actions and focus on the defendant's conduct. 16
More significantly, however, the legislature limited the admissibility
of a complainant's past sexual conduct by enacting a rape shield law
in 1978.17
The Illinois rape shield statute presumes that any evidence of
the complainant's past sexual behavior is inadmissible, except where
that activity is with the accused. 18 This statute embraces three fun-
damental goals. First, the statute protects the complainant from be-
ing harassed or humiliated with unreliable evidence of her
reputation for chastity or with specific prior sexual conduct with
third persons. 19 Second, the statute seeks to promote effective law
enforcement by encouraging women to report sexual offenses with
the knowledge that their prior sexual activity will not be divulged to
the public.20 Finally, the statute keeps the sexual offense trial fo-
cused only on issues relevant to the controversy at hand.2 1
While these purposes behind the rape shield statute are lauda-
ble, each must be tested for its validity in the context of a case where
every six, sexual assaults are ever reported to the police. National Victim Center, Rape in
America: A Report to the Nation, at 5 (hereinafter Rape in America). The primary reasons
underlying the victim's reluctance were that her family would discover that she had been
assaulted, and people would blame her for the attack. Id. at 4.
15 In 1984, Illinois reformed its sexual offense laws with two gradations of "rape,"
criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual assault. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 12-13, 12-14 (1984). The Illinois legislature also enacted two gradations for sex-
ual offenses not involving penetration, criminal sexual abuse and aggravated criminal
sexual abuse. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-15, 12-16 (1984).
16 Galvin, supra note 4, at 768-69 (citing ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD M. BoYCE,
CRIMINAL LAW 197-200 (3d ed. 1982)). An advantage of codification was the gradation of
sexual offenses, which served two important functions. First, as stated, gradations fo-
cused the inquiry on the conduct of the defendant. Galvin, supra note 4, at 769 n.18.
Second, gradations increased the likelihood of conviction. Many states had imposed
severe prison terms or capital punishment for the crime of forcible sexual assault, and
juries, accordingly, were often reluctant to convict without forceful evidence. By grad-
ing the offenses, the penalty structure could more equitably match the crime, leading to
less jury reluctance and more convictions. Id., n. 19.
17 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-7 (1989).
18 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-7 (1989). The statute now reads, in pertinent
part:
(a) In prosecutions for aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault,
aggravated criminal sexual abuse or criminal sexual abuse, the prior sexual activity or
the reputation of the alleged victim is inadmissible except as evidence concerning the
past sexual conduct of the alleged victim with the accused.
19 People v. Ellison, 463 N.E.2d 175, 183 (Ill. App. 1984).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 184.
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the criminal defendant attempts to offer evidence of the complain-
ant's past sexual conduct that is highly relevant to his defense. One
purpose of the statute-sparing the alleged victim from humilia-
tion-cannot justify depriving the defendant of his constitutional
rights to present relevant evidence and confront adverse wit-
nesses.22 Such protection of the complainant's privacy cannot pre-
vail in a system which presumes the criminal defendant's innocence
prior to trial23 and places heightened value on protection of the
accused.
24
Another purpose behind the rape shield statute-the incentive
to report sexual assaults-is even less justifiable in this context. It is
paradoxical to encourage reporting by a rule which impairs the
factfinder's ability to determine the truth of that report.2 5 Report-
ing should be viewed as the first step in the judicial process, not an
end in itself.26 Moreover, the mere fact that an increase in the re-
porting of sexual assaults will inevitably lead to an increased
number of convictions is an insufficient justification for abridging a
defendant's constitutional rights. To justify categorical exclusion of
relevant defense evidence in order to increase convictions is to
either assume the defendant's guilt or allow the defendant to be
hampered in his defense so that actual rapists can be convicted.
2 7
However, the third purpose of the rape shield statute-prevent-
ing a woman's past sexual activity from suggesting her likelihood to
consent on a subsequent occasion-remains valid when weighed
against the defendant's attempt to introduce sexual conduct evi-
dence. This purpose reflects the legislative judgment that a com-
plainant's past sexual activity is irrelevant for determining her
likelihood to consent to sex on a subsequent occasion. Thus, any
evidence proffered by the defendant is by definition "irrelevant" if it
22 See People v. Triplett, 485 N.E.2d 9 (Ill. 1985) (holding that the defendant's right
to confront adverse witnesses trumps policy of protecting witnesses from exposure of
juvenile criminal records). See also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320 (1974) ("[T]he
State's desire that [the victim] fulfill his public duty to testify free from embarrassment
and with his reputation unblemished must fall before the right of [the accused] to seek
out the truth in the process of defending himself.").
23 See In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
24 See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 706 (1975) ("[It is far worse to convict an
innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.") (quoting Winship, 397 U.S. at 372
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
25 David H. Doherty, "Sparing" the Complainant "Spoils" the Trial, 40 C.R. 55, 65 (3d
ed. 1984).
26 Id.
27 D.W. Elliot, Rape Complainants' Sexual Experience with Third Parties, CRIM. L. REv. 4,
14 (1984); see also Seaboyer v. The Queen, File No. 20666, at 82 (Can. Supreme Court
1991).
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relies on the inference that the complainant consented to sexual
conduct with the defendant because she had been sexually active in
the past. Because no defendant has a constitutional right to present
irrelevant evidence, 28 evidence of the alleged victim's sexual back-
ground is automatically inadmissible if offered to show her likeli-
hood to consent.
This comment will address the validity of the purposes for
which evidence of the alleged victim's sexual history may be used in
Illinois, basing the evidence's admissibility on whether it relies on
the propensity inference-the controversial stereotype that a wo-
man who has previously engaged in consensual sexual activity will
more likely consent to sexual activity on another occasion.2 9 In ad-
dition, this comment will argue that the propensity inference at-
taches to the use of a complainant's sexual history to suggest that
she did not consent to sexual activity with the accused. Accordingly,
this comment will assert that evidence of the complainant's past sex-
ual conduct that relies on the propensity inference should be ex-
cluded, and that such evidence, if it is relevant for any reason other
than propensity to consent, should be admitted.
Part II of this comment will analyze two problematic features of
the Illinois rape shield statute: the lack of judicial discretion in ap-
plying the statute and the statute's failure to address other poten-
tially relevant uses of past sexual conduct evidence. In addition, this
section will examine a recent holding by the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois that strictly construed the application of the Illinois rape shield
law, thereby mitigating some of the potentially troublesome effects
of the law's failure to allow judicial discretion in implementing the
statute. Part III of this comment will review the various purposes
for which evidence of the complainant's past sexual conduct may be
offered, the validity of each purpose under current Illinois law, and
whether or not different uses of the evidence deserve statutory pro-
tection through an amendment to the Illinois rape shield statute.
Part IV will outline the proposed amendments to the statute, which
address the potentially valid uses of such evidence discussed in Part
III of this comment. This comment concludes that the courts and
legislatures must consistently reject evidence of the complainant's
prior sexual conduct regardless of its purpose, if such evidence re-
lies on the propensity inference. Further, this comment suggests
28 See State v. Campos, 507 N.E.2d 1342, 1348 (Ill. App. 1987).
29 This discussion will not address the stereotype that equates promiscuity with lack
of credibility; nearly every state has rejected this notion as outdated. But see S.C. CODE




that sexual conduct evidence that does not rely on the propensity
inference deserves statutory and judicial protection in concert with
the fundamental principles of criminal due process.
II. THE ILLINOIS RAPE SHIELD STATUTE
In 1978, the Illinois legislature enacted the Illinois rape shield
statute.30 This statute prohibits the introduction of any evidence of
the alleged victim's past sexual behavior, except where that activity
is between the alleged victim and the accused.3' This statute affords
the defendant an in camera hearing to present evidence of past sex-
ual behavior between the complainant and the defendant.3 2 The
judge then decides whether the evidence proffered by the defense is
sufficiently probative to be used at trial to impeach the alleged vic-
tim's testimony on the issue of her consent.33
This section will discuss two characteristics of the Illinois rape
shield statute that raise questions about the law's effect on sexual
assault trials. First, the law affords no discretion to the court in de-
termining whether to prohibit evidence of the complainant's past
sexual conduct. Second, the statute fails to acknowledge several le-
gitimate purposes for which evidence of past sexual behavior could
be used. Each of these characteristics suggests that application of
the Illinois rape shield statute may impair the defendant's ability to
receive a fair trial in sexual assault cases.
A. THE ABSENCE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION
The Illinois rape shield statute is one of a minority of such laws
that does not allow for judicial discretion in determining the propri-
ety of the law's application at trial.3 4 Under the statute, the judge
may not balance the probative value of the evidence against its prej-
30 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-7 (1989).
31 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-7(b) (1989). For a reading of the text, see supra
note 18. In its presumptive exclusion of evidence of the complainant's past sexual be-
havior, the Illinois rape shield statute is similar to the majority of state rape shield laws,
which Professor Galvin labels the "Michigan" model of rape shield statutes. See Galvin,
supra note 4, at 812-76.
32 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-7(b) (1989).
33 Id. Thejudge must find that the evidence is reasonably specific as to the date, time
and/or place of the defendant's alleged previous sexual encounter with the complainant.
34 Eight other states have enacted rape shield laws depriving trial judges of discre-
tion. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-203(d) (Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3(C)
(1982). The majority of state rape shield statutes require a balancing test of probative
value and prejudicial effect, either explicitly or implicitly. Compare MICH. COmp. LAws
ANN. § 750.520j (West Supp. 1985) (explicitly requiring the court to balance probative
value of evidence with its prejudicial effect) with Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.31(11) (West
1985) (merely providing that court must determine admissibility of evidence on pretrial
400 [Vol. 83
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udicial effect.3 5 Rather, if the evidence involves past sexual conduct
between the complainant and the accused and is reasonably specific,
the judge must admit the evidence, regardless of the reason prof-
fered for its admission.3 6 Similarly, if the evidence involves past
sexual conduct between the complainant and someone other than
the accused, the judge must exclude it.37
The results of the application of this mechanical rule may be
startling. Consider a situation in which the complainant testifies
that she has only engaged in consensual intercourse with her hus-
band. The defendant seeks to impeach the complainant's testimony
by introducing evidence that she has had sexual intercourse with
others. Although the evidence is offered not to show her propensity
to consent to intercourse, but rather to impeach the veracity of the
complainant's testimony, the defendant would nonetheless be pro-
hibited from introducing such evidence simply because the alleged
partner is someone other than the accused. Regardless of the rape
shield statute's purpose, a constitutionally based legal system
should not countenance such an impairment of the defendant's
right to confront a witness.3 8
The Illinois Supreme Court has resolved this dilemma, how-
ever, by applying the rape shield statute's prohibition to the prose-
cution as well as the defense. In People v. Sandoval,3 9 the
complainant testified that she had never previously engaged in anal
intercourse with anyone other than the defendant.40 To impeach
motion). For a summary of the features of each state's rape shield laws as of 1980, see
Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 4, at 592-602.
35 See Galvin, supra note 4, at 813; Colleen M. Loftus, Comment, The Illinois Rape
Shield Statute: Privacy at Any Cost?, 15 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 157, 174 (1982).
36 The automatic admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct with the accused is
suspect in that it implies the same sexual propensity stereotypes discussed earlier in this
comment. See note 29, supra, and accompanying text. The discretion a woman exercises
in her sexual choices should not be confined to encounters with those with whom she
has not previously had sexual contact. Simply put, the complainant could just as likely
have withheld her consent to sexual activity with a former partner as she might with a
"new" person. However, this discussion is outside the scope of this comment, which
simply deals with the potential lack of protection to the criminal defendant due to the
statute's overbroad prohibition of sexual conduct evidence.
37 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-7 (1989).
38 See ILL. CONST. 1970, art. I, § 8 ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right ... to meet the witnesses face to face .. "); U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.").
39 552 N.E.2d 726 (Ill. 1990). For a concise discussion of Sandoval, see People v. Bell,
577 N.E.2d 1228 (Ill. App. 1991).
40 During the complainant's direct examination at trial, the following exchange oc-
curred between the State's Attorney and the complainant:
"Q. Now, you had had anal sex with him before?
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this testimony, the defense sought to introduce evidence that the
complainant had consented to anal sex with third persons on several
occasions in the past.41 At trial, the court excluded this evidence on
the grounds that it was barred by the Illinois rape shield statute.
42
The Illinois Appellate Court reversed, holding that the de-
fense's evidence should have been allowed to rebut claims made by
the victim. The court reasoned that the rape shield statute should
not be read to preclude evidence of the complainant's past sexual
history when used as rebuttal evidence:
Where the evidence is relevant and is introduced, not to harass the
witness but only in a defensive response to the alleged victim's own
initiative, the statute does not preclude an exception to the general
protective umbrella it places over victims of sexual assault.
43
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, rea-
soning that the appellate court's holding was inconsistent with the
exclusionary nature of the rape shield statute.44 The high court re-
frained from deciding whether a victim "opens the door" to evi-
dence of past sexual conduct by testifying to such conduct. Instead,
the court attacked the appellate court's creation of an exception to
the rape shield statute, given the plain language of the law. 45 The
court found that the language of the Illinois rape shield law does not
distinguish between evidence of the victim's past sexual behavior
brought by the prosecution and similar evidence brought by the de-
fense. 46 Thus, the Illinois rape shield statute precludes the prosecu-
A. Yes.
Q. And on how many occasions had he had anal sex with you?
A. Twice.
Q. And do you recall at whose request that occurred?
A. [Sandoval's].
Q. Had you ever had anal sex in the past?
A. With others?
Q Yes, with other people.
A. No."
Sandoval, 552 N.E.2d at 728.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 People v. Sandoval, 533 N.E.2d 980, 984-85 (Ill. App. 1989) (Nash, J.), rev'd, 552
N.E.2d 726 (Ill. 1990).
44 Sandoval, 552 N.E.2d at 730-31.
45 Id. The court reasoned that:
[t]he language of the statute ... is concise and precise. Resort to legislative his-
tory-the factors which prompted the rule-is necessary only when the statute is
vague or ambiguous and clarification of the underlying intent is needed to assist
interpretation of the language. . . .The rape shield statute is neither vague nor
ambiguous.
46 Id. at 731 (Clark, J.) ("We note that the statute does not limit its proscription to a
defendant's attempts to introduce evidence of the victim's prior sexual en-
counters .. "). See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-7(a) (1989) ("...the prior sexual
402 [Vol. 83
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tion, as well as the defense, from introducing evidence of the
victim's past sexual behavior, or lack thereof.47
Sandoval's interpretation of the Illinois rape shield statute is
consistent with the rejection of the propensity inference. 48 If evi-
dence of the complainant's past sexual behavior is not generally rel-
evant to whether she consented to sexual relations on any particular
occasion, the prosecution should also be prohibited from introduc-
ing the evidence to prove that the alleged victim did not consent to
sex.
4 9
Thus, Sandoval mitigates the troubling effects of the absence of
a judicial-discretion provision in the Illinois rape shield statute by
denying use of past sexual conduct evidence to both sides. Notwith-
standing the conclusion reached in Sandoval, the need for a more
flexible rape shield statute will become apparent in the following
section of this discussion.
activity or the reputation of the alleged victim is inadmissible except as evidence con-
cerning the past sexual conduct of the alleged victim with the accused.").
47 Sandoval, 552 N.E. 2d at 731.
48 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. It has been suggested that a complainant
should be permitted to waive the rape shield law's protection for two reasons. First,
most complainants would not agree to a disclosure of their sexual past except to show a
lack of sexual activity, similar to the complainant's claim in Sandoval, thereby avoiding
the traditional propensity inferences surrounding alleged sexual assault victims. Sec-
ond, the defendant would be entitled to admit rebuttal evidence, thereby providing an-
other barrier to prejudice. See Galvin, supra note 4, at 857.
However, such an analysis assumes that the evil to be eradicated is limited to the
inference that a woman will consent on a particular occasion because she consented in
the past. As previously set forth, this comment has adopted a broader definition of the
inference to include any evidence of past sexual conduct that attempts to predict the
complainant's future sexual decisions. Thus, evidence of the complainant's lack of prior
sexual conduct would violate this principle in that it implies that the complainant did not
consent based on her non-consent in the past. See infra notes 151-81 and accompanying
text.
49 The prosecution's use of past sexual behavior may be more suspect than the de-
fense's use. The prosecution's use of the evidence would almost invariably be employed
to show non-consent, while the defense would often only attempt to introduce such
evidence to rebut what it alleges to be perjured testimony by the alleged victim. Thus,
in order to remain faithful to the rejection of the outdated inference of propensity, the
decision in Sandoval to forbid the prosecution from "opening the door" is a necessary
one.
Another advantage of the Sandoval holding is that the defendant may not use the
"open door" rebuttal to attempt to introduce evidence of the alleged victim's sexual
history to suggest propensity. See 23 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH A. GRAHAM, JR.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5386, at 562 (1980) (citing Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 17 (1976)):
The remedy of the defense is to object when the complainant [makes a statement
about her past sexual behavior]; [he] may not use the prosecution's violation of [the




B. LACK OF EXCEPTIONS
Aside from evidence of the alleged victim's sexual history with
the accused, the Illinois rape shield statute does not provide any
exceptions where evidence of the complainant's past sexual conduct
is admissible in sexual assault trials.50 Such exceptions might in-
clude evidence of the complainant's past sexual behavior that sug-
gests alternative sources of certain physical consequences ascribed
to an alleged attack;51 evidence which demonstrates that the com-
plainant had a motive to lie; 52 evidence which explains how a very
young complainant might otherwise have knowledge of sexual be-
havior;53 or evidence that shows the complainant consented to the
sexual activity at issue.
54
By creating a general prohibition against evidence of past sex-
ual activity between the complainant and third persons, the Illinois
rape shield statute fails to recognize that sexual conduct evidence
may derive its relevancy from a source other than the propensity
inference. 55 The statute proscribes the use of sexual history evi-
dence without exception, when it should limit its prohibition to the
misuse of this evidence to suggest that the complainant's general sex-
ual background is predictive of her likelihood to consent on a future
occasion.56 As a result, the rape shield statute betrays the very pol-
icy which imbues the legislation: finding the truth and arriving at
the correct verdict.
57
Evidence of the complainant's past sexual behavior that does
not derive its relevance from the propensity inference should be ad-
missible. This principle will be applied throughout the remainder
of this discussion, which studies the various purposes for introduc-
ing the complainant's sexual history in a sexual assault trial.
III. PURPOSES OF SEXUAL CONDUCT EVIDENCE IN ILLINOIS LAW
Evidence of the complainant's past sexual behavior with some-
50 See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-7 (1989). See supra note 18, for a reading of
the relevant text.
51 See infra notes 58-95 and accompanying text.
52 See infra notes 96-118 and accompanying text.
53 See infra notes 119-41 and accompanying text.
54 See infra notes 142-222 and accompanying text.
55 See Seaboyer v. The Queen, File No. 20666 (Can. Supreme Ct. 1991), where the
Supreme Court of Canada recently invalidated a rape shield statute similar to the one in
Illinois, holding that the statute violated the defendant's right to a fair trial and his right
to liberty "in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." See CAN. CONST.
pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), §§ 7, 11 (d).
56 See Seaboyer, File No. 20666, at 84; Galvin, supra note 4, at 812.
57 See Seaboyer, File No. 20666, at 85.
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one other than the accused may be relevant for several purposes
other than to imply propensity to consent. This section will discuss
how current Illinois law affects the admissibility of sexual conduct
evidence when offered for these various purposes and will deter-
mine whether each of the uses of the evidence deserves exemption
from the Illinois rape shield statute.
A. PROOF OF ALTERNATIVE SOURCE OF PHYSICAL CONDITION
A defendant in a sexual assault trial may attempt to offer evi-
dence of the alleged victim's past sexual conduct with third persons
to counter evidence of the complainant's physical condition, sug-
gesting that the defendant had intercourse with the complainant. 58
For example, the prosecution may offer evidence of the enlargement
of the complainant's hymen as proof of intercourse. 59 When of-
fered, such evidence carries with it the presumption that the defend-
ant caused the enlargement of the hymen through the alleged sexual
assault.60 This presumption would be especially strong with a very
58 Several states have created exceptions in their rape shield statutes for evidence of
the complainant's past sexual behavior when offered to provide an alternative reason for
the complainant's physical condition. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2) (West Supp.
1985) (admissible to show source of semen, pregnancy, injury, disease); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-37-4-4(b)(2) (Burns 1985) (admissible to prove someone other than defendant
committed sexual offense); ME. R. EvID. 412(b)(1) (admissible to show source of semen,
injury); MD. GRIM. LAW CODE ANN. § 461(A) (1991) (admissible to show source of se-
men, pregnancy, disease, trauma); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 233, § 2 1B (Law. Co-op. 1985)
(admissible to show conduct of the complainant is the cause of any physical feature,
characteristic or condition of complainant); MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.520j(1)(b)
(West Supp. 1985) (admissible to show source of semen, pregnancy, disease); MINN. R.
EVID. 404(c)(1)(B) (admissible to show source of semen, pregnancy, disease); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 491.015(1)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (admissible to show source of semen, preg-
nancy, disease); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(4)(b) (1985) (admissible to show source
of semen, pregnancy, disease); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-321(2)(a) (Supp. 1984) (admissible
to show source of any physical evidence including, but not limited to, semen, injury,
blood, saliva and hair); N.C.R. EvID. 412 (admissible to show that act charged not com-
mitted by defendant); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(D) (Baldwin 1986) (admissible
to show source of semen, pregnanacy, disease); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1(1) (Law.
Co-op. 1985) (admissible to show source of semen, pregnancy, disease); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 3255(a)(3)(B) (Supp. 1985) (admissible to show source of semen, pregnancy,
disease); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.7(A)(1) (Michie 1992) (admissible to show source of
semen, pregnancy, disease, injury to complaining witness's intimate parts).
59 See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1987). This highly criticized
case held that the complainant's enlarged hymen did not fall within the "injury" excep-
tion to the federal rape shield statute, see FED. R. EVID. 412, and therefore the defense
was properly precluded from admitting evidence that other sexual partners were indeed
the cause of the enlarged hymen.
60 Of course, evidence such as an enlarged hymen, which merely proves intercourse,




young complainant who is far less likely to be sexually active. 61
Illinois courts have recently recognized the need for evidence
of past sexual conduct to explain certain physical conditions of the
complainant. In People v. Mason,62 the defendant was convicted of
two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault of a seven-year-old
girl. 63 At trial, the prosecution admitted evidence of irregularities in
the complainant's hymenal ring.64 When the defendant sought to
explain the source of the irregularity through testimony that the
complainant inserted crayons and other items in her vagina, the trial
court ruled the evidence inadmissible under the Illinois rape shield
statute.
65
The Illinois Appellate Court reversed, holding that the exclu-
sion of the proffered evidence denied the defendant his constitu-
tional right to confront an adverse witness. 66 The court reasoned
that the purposes of the rape shield statute-preventing humiliation
of the complainant and encouraging the reporting of sexual of-
fenses-could not justify denying the defendant his right to present
critical evidence. 67
Evidence of an enlarged hymen is by no means the only physi-
cal condition for which evidence of past sexual conduct may be rele-
vant in sexual offense trials. Other evidence which bears on the
outcome of these trials includes the presence of semen in the com-
plainant's vagina 68 and the existence of a sexually transmitted dis-
ease.69 To date, no Illinois court has decided whether these types of
evidence deserve exemption from the Illinois rape shield statute's
proscription.
A closely related example of physical consequence evidence is
that of the complainant's pregnancy. This evidence merits separate
61 For example, the complainant in Shaw was 11 years old. Shaw, 824 F.2d at 602.
62 578 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. 1991).
63 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-14(b)(1) (1989).
64 Mason, 578 N.E.2d at 1353.
65 Id. Mason presents a more difficult issue of admissibility than some cases might
because it is unclear whether evidence of masturbation with a foreign instrument falls
within the proscriptive scope of the Illinois rape shield statute. To be sure, one's self is
"someone other than the accused," but is masturbation considered "sexual activity"
within the meaning of the statute? Fortunately, this question need not be resolved, be-
cause admitting this evidence is nonetheless necessary to explain the source of the com-
plainant's physical condition.
66 Id. (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)).
67 Id. The court, while acknowledging the commendable purposes behind the stat-
ute, wrote that "[t]he rape shield statute should be construed and applied so as to up-
hold the constitutional rights of the defendant." Id. at 1354 (citing Summitt v. Nevada,
697 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Nev. 1985)).
68 See State v. LaClair, 433 A.2d 1326 (N.H. 1981).
69 See Brown v. State, 327 S.E.2d 515 (Ga. App. 1985).
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discussion because it is rarely offered as "evidence" 70 but may often
be plainly visible to the jury.71 Similar to other evidence of physical
condition, the complainant's pregnancy may carry with it an infer-
ence that the defendant is responsible. In a case where the defend-
ant denies that he engaged in intercourse with the complainant, 72
and where the timing of the sexual offense trial and the alleged at-
tack are such that the complainant could be carrying the defendant's
child at the time of trial, it could be reasonable for the jury to infer
that the defendant is the father of the unborn child.
The Illinois courts have yet to address the question of whether
the defense may introduce evidence of the complainant's past sexual
behavior to rebut an inference that the defendant is responsible for
the complainant's pregnancy.73 However, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue74 while inter-
preting the Indiana rape shield statute.75 In Moore v. Duckworth, the
defendant was convicted of a sexual offense under Indiana law. 76 At
70 But see United States v. Duran, 886 F.2d 167, 168 (8th Cir. 1989) (prosecutor asked
the complainant on the witness stand, "Did there come a time in February of '87 that
you had your baby...?").
71 See Moore v. Duckworth, 687 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1982) (trial court attempted to
conceal complainant's pregnancy from the jury by removingjury every time complainant
stood up).
72 In many cases, the defendant does not deny intercourse but instead claims that it
was consensual. Conceivably, the complainant's pregnancy could also be used by the
accused, if the accused admitted to fathering the child, to imply consent. The defendant
could posit that if the complainant did not consent to sexual relations, she would have
aborted the child that resulted from the intercourse. This reasoning would rely on three
assumptions: first, that it was the intercourse at issue that resulted in conception (if the
defendant claimed that he had engaged in intercourse with the complainant at times
other than the occasion at issue, a claim which could be supported with evidence under
the current Illinois rape shield statute); second, that the woman does not plan in the
future to abort the fetus; and third, that the woman's refusal to abort is based on her
consent to the intercourse that conceived the fetus. Even if such a case arose, however,
this use of the evidence would not involve the rape shield statute, as the defendant's
claim of consent would be based on the woman's pregnancy, not on her prior sexual
history with other partners.
73 This is not to say that the issue of pregnancy in a trial for sexual assault has never
arisen, but rather it did not arise as an inference that the defendant was responsible for
the pregnancy. See People v. Gray, 568 N.E.2d 219 (Ill. App. 1991) (evidence of com-
plainant's alleged fear of pregnancy by third party offered as motive for complainant to
fabricate charge of sexual assault).
74 See Moore v. Duckworth, 687 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1982).
75 IND. CODE § 35-1-32.5-1 (1978). Under the then-existing Indiana rape shield stat-
ute, evidence of the complainant's past sexual conduct, through specific acts, reputation
or opinion, was generally not admissible. A separate provision created two exceptions:
evidence of past sexual conduct with the accused or evidence that someone else commit-
ted the crime. IND. CODE § 35-1-32.5-2 (1978).
76 Duckworth, 687 F.2d at 1063. The defendant was convicted under IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-42-4-1 (Bums 1979).
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the time of trial, the complainant was about six months pregnant
with a child fathered by her boyfriend.77 Acting on the prosecu-
tion's motion, the trial court prohibited any reference to the preg-
nancy or prior sexual conduct between the complainant and her
boyfriend. 78 The court took great strides to keep the fact of the
complainant's pregnancy from the jury.
79
The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding
that "(a)ny evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct, including
the fact of this victim's pregnancy," was precluded by the rape
shield statute, and therefore the trial court properly granted the
state's motion in limine.80 The court noted that the defendant could
have simply opposed the motion and moved for a continuance until
the complainant gave birth.81 More importantly, the court found
that, notwithstanding the defendant's protests on appeal, there was
no conclusive evidence that any jurors knew of the complainant's
pregnancy. 82
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
hearing the case on a petition of habeus corpus, reluctantly affirmed,
criticizing the Indiana Supreme Court's refusal to create an excep-
77 Duckworth, 687 F.2d at 1063.
78 Moore v. State, 393 N.E.2d 175, 177 (Ind. 1979). This case is the Indiana
Supreme Court case, which was later appealed on a writ of habeus corpus to federal court
and ultimately reached the Seventh Circuit as Moore v. Duckworth, 687 F.2d 1063 (7th
Cir. 1982).
79 [The complainant] was seated close to the prosecutor's counsel table with a coat
over her lap at one point in the trial. She never stood up in the presence of the
jury. The jury was excused whenever [the complainant] had to leave or enter the
courtroom-at least five different occasions during the trial. The court did not al-
lude in any way to the reason why the jury was being excused. When she took the
stand, [the complainant] was sworn in, then the jury was brought into the court-
room and the judge told them that she had already taken the oath. The first time
the judge excused the jury for the purpose of [the complainant]'s exit, he said:
'Now, there will be a number of questions in your mind about what is going on.
That occurs in every trial. We can't give you an explanation now. Keep these in
the back of your mind and at the end o ury service, all your questions will be
answered.... I see some questions on some of your faces. Don't worry about it
until-I will tell you whaappened after it is all over and the reasons why it is
being done the way it is. All right.'
Duckworth, 687 F.2d at 1063.
80 Moore v. State, 393 N.E.2d 175, 177 (Ind. 1979).
81 Id. at 176.
82 Id. The court stated:
Defendant's allegation of error demands an assumption that the jurors were aware
of [the complainant's] pregnancy. There is no evidence in the record showing what
the jury thought. There never is. However, we would be speculating to say that the
jury became aware of the victim's pregnancy .... If defendant had established di-
rect evidence that one or more jurors became aware of the victim's pregnant condi-
tion, we would reach a different result here.
Id. at 177 (Hunter, J.). The court made this finding despite the fact that one of the
jurors asked to see the complainant stand at one point during the trial, a request which
the trial court denied. Id.
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tion to the Indiana rape shield statute.83 The court wrote:
To us, a stipulation or judicial instruction that [the complainant's]
pregnancy was due to someone other than [the defendant] would
hardly seem to be "evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct" of the
sort that the [Indiana] Rape Shield Law was designed to make inadmis-
sible. In any event, a narrow judge-made exception from the rape
shield law for cases like this would seem appropriate .... 84
The Seventh Circuit also criticized the Indiana Supreme
Court's suggestion that the defendant could have moved for a con-
tinuance, given that the defendant remained imprisoned pending
trial.8 5 Nevertheless, the circuit court, bound both by the state
supreme court's reading of its rape shield statute and by the trial
court's finding that the jury did not know the complainant was preg-
nant, held that the defendant had not proved prejudice.8 6
Duckworth and the other cases discussed above illustrate the
types of physical evidence that may be necessary to the prosecu-
tion's case as corroboration of the complainant's testimony.8 7 Yet
this evidence may also imply that the defendant is to blame for the
physical consequence. Given the possibility of this inference, the
defendant should be permitted to rebut such evidence by showing
that someone or something88 else was responsible for the physical
condition.8
9
83 Moore v. Duckworth, 687 F.2d 1063, 1065 (7th Cir. 1982).
84 Id. (Cummings, J.).
85 Given that [the complainant] was approximately six months pregnant at the
time of trial and allowing another month after birth for [the complainant's] recovery
and rescheduling of the trial, [the defendant] would have had to wait in jail an extra
four months until he could be tried.... Four months in jail is a high premium to
pay for the right of avoiding the prejudice of [the complainant's] pregnancy com-
pared to what would seem to be the simple and immediate way of dispelling the
potential prejudice by telling the jury the truth.
Duckworth, 687 F.2d at 1065 (Cummings, J.).
86 Id. This comment does not address the efficacy of attempting to conceal a sexual
assault complainant's pregnancy from the jury. While the purpose behind the conceal-
ment is admirable, the efficacy of such an attempt, as Duckworth illustrates, is dubious.
87 As stated earlier, pregnancy is sometimes not offered as evidence or discussed in
testimony. However, evidence of semen, injury, disease or any other physical conse-
quence of an alleged sexual assault is usually quite helpful to the prosecution.
88 See People v. Mason, 578 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. 1991) (enlarged hymen allegedly
caused by penetration of crayon).
89 Another alternative is available: all evidence of the complainant's physical condi-
tion could be banned. While this possibility would ensure a fair trial to the defendant, it
would have the effect of prohibiting a broad category of highly relevant evidence from
the prosecution's use. Considering that prosecutions for sexual assault often rest almost
solely on the testimony of the complainant, see, e.g., In Interest of C.K.M., 481 N.E.2d
883 (Ill. App. 1985), such corroborating evidence may be essential to effective prosecu-
tion (though not legally necessary, as a sexual assault complainant's testimony need not
be substantially corroborated. People v.Judge, 582 N.E.2d 1211 (Ill. App. 1991)). Any
resulting prejudice to the defendant could then be mitigated, as this comment will advo-
19921 409
DAVID ELLIS
The Seventh Circuit's suggestion in Duckworth, that a court em-
ploy a simple judicial instruction explaining that the defendant is
not responsible for the pregnancy to remove the taint of "preg-
nancy" evidence, fairly resolves this problem90 when the acknowl-
edged father of the fetus is someone other than the defendant.9 '
This judicial instruction would not rely on the impermissible infer-
ence that the complainant is sexually promiscuous and therefore
consented to sexual conduct with the defendant. Instead, the in-
struction would serve only to dispel an unfair presumption against
the defendant raised by the prosecution's evidence. 92
Unfortunately, the defendant's attempts to disprove his respon-
sibility for physical conditions of the complainant-such as in-
creased vaginal size, the presence of semen or the contraction of a
sexually transmitted disease 93-is likely to incite prejudice among
cate, by the defense's introduction of the complainant's past sexual behavior to provide
an alternative source for the physical condition.
90 Indeed, in 1983, shortly after the decision in Duckworth, the Indiana legislature
amended the state's rape shield statute to include, inter alia, evidence that the defendant
was not the cause of the complainant's pregnancy. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-
4(b)(3) (Burns 1985).
91 If the sexual assault trial was sufficiently removed from the time of the alleged
attack so that the defendant could not have fathered the fetus, the court may wish to
conceal the complainant's pregnancy to remove the propensity inference that the obvi-
ously sexually active complainant consented to the sexual activity at issue. While the
efficacy of such a concealment is dubious, see Moore v. State, 393 N.E.2d at 177, the
attempt is admirable and does not implicate the defendant's constitutional rights.
92 In cases where the prosecution refuses to stipulate that a third party was responsi-
ble for the pregnancy, the defense undoubtedly will want to introduce substantive exam-
ples of the complainant's past sexual conduct to rebut the inference that the defendant
is the father. See Shockley v. State, 585 S.W.2d 645 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). The
resulting explanatory evidence, however, could be more susceptible to the propensity
inference than the mere stipulation of the father's identity. Therefore, assuming the
defendant proffers sexual conduct evidence, the prosecution will have an incentive to
agree to the stipulation when the defendant is clearly not the father. Where it is unclear
who is responsible for the pregnancy, the inference that the defendant is responsible is
not necessarily an unreasonable one, for he may indeed be responsible. In such cases,
the defendant must be permitted to address the inference.
93 Of course, it is possible that the complainant would have contracted a sexually
transmitted disease prior to the alleged attack, in which case a stipulation explaining this
fact would suffice. Moreover, in that scenario, it is unlikely that evidence of this disease
would even be relevant to the case. Conceivably, evidence of a sexually transmitted
disease could be offered on the issue of consent; the prosecution could theorize that the
complainant would be less likely to consent to sexual intercourse given her disease, and
the defendant could argue that the "spiteful" complainant engaged in sexual acts to
spread her disease (the latter proposition would clearly require additional evidence of
the complainant's state of mind and behavior following her contraction of the disease).
It is unlikely, however, that evidence of a sexually transmitted disease, admittedly trans-
ferred to the complainant by someone other than the defendant, would be admissible
under the Illinois rape shield statute, given the Illinois courts' liberal reading of the
phrase "past sexual behavior." See People v. Kemblowski, 559 N.E.2d 247, 250 (Ill.
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the jurors.94 If the prosecution introduces such physical evidence,
however, the defense must have an opportunity to rebut any preju-
dicial inferences that this evidence may suggest to the jury. Where
the relevancy of rebuttal evidence does not rest on the propensity
inference, the Illinois rape shield statute should not preclude the
evidence's admission. 95
B. PROOF OF MOTIVE TO FABRICATE
The defendant may also offer evidence of the complainant's
prior sexual activity with third parties to show the complainant's
motive to fabricate a sexual assault charge. 96 Both the Illinois and
United States Supreme Courts have held that the defendant's right
to expose an adverse witness's bias or motive to testify falsely must
supersede the policies underlying statutory or common law rules
aimed at protecting these witnesses at trial.97 Recently, the Illinois
Appellate Court addressed the use of past sexual conduct evidence
App. 1990) (holding that evidence that complainant is a lesbian, although characterized
by prosecution as evidence of "sexual status" rather than sexual activity, nonetheless
refers by definition to the complainant's sexual activities and is inadmissible under the
Illinois rape shield statute).
94 "Such evidence allows stereotype and myth to enter into the equation and side-
tracks the search for the truth." Seaboyer v. The Queen, File No. 20666, at 225 (Can.
Supreme Ct. 1991) (L'Heureux-Dub&,J., dissenting).
95 But see Brown v. State, 327 S.E.2d 515, 516-17 (Ga. App. 1985) (excluding evi-
dence that complainant's vaginal infection was caused by a third party); State v. Peyatt,
315 S.E.2d 574, 576 (W. Va. 1983) (excluding evidence to explain why complainant's
vagina was "obliterated" and "look~ed] like that of a married woman."), cited in Galvin,
supra note 4, at 824 n.300. See also United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1987)
(precluding defendant from explaining alternate source for complainant's enlarged
hymen).
96 Two states have created exceptions to rape shield statutes for evidence of past
sexual behavior to show motive to falsify charges of sexual assault. See MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 461A(a)(3) (1982); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.7(B) (Michie 1982). Professor
Galvin notes that a third state, North Carolina, provides an exception for "specific in-
stances of sexual behavior offered for the purpose of showing that the act or acts
charged were not committed by the defendant .. " N.C.R. EvID. 412. This provision
appears to be broad enough to encompass evidence offered to show motive to fabricate
testimony. Galvin, supra note 4, at 826 n.316.
Other courts have carved out an exception to their respective rape shield laws to
admit past sexual conduct evidence to show a complainant's bias. See Commonwealth v.
Black, 487 A.2d 396 (Pa. Super. 1985); State v. LaClair, 433 A.2d 1326 (N.H. 1981);
Marion v. State, 590 S.W.2d 288 (Ark. 1979); State v. Jalo, 557 P.2d 1359 (Or. App.
1976) (en banc); Maryland v. Delawder, 344 A.2d 446 (Md. App. 1975).
97 See People v. Triplett, 485 N.E.2d 9 (Ill. 1985) (holding that, notwithstanding pol-
icy of precluding juvenile crimes as impeachment evidence, defendant's right to con-
frontation prevails when juvenile criminal charges could still be reinstated against
witness, thereby exposing witness's bias to testify favorably for prosecution); Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (defendant is entitled to confront his witnesses con-
cerning possible motive to fabricate testimony to protect his probationary status,
notwithstanding state policy against use ofjuvenile records for impeachment).
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with third parties to expose a witness's bias.98 In People v. Gray,99 the
defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault.10 0
At trial, the defense sought to introduce evidence that the complain-
ant filed the sexual offense charges because she feared she had be-
come pregnant by her boyfriend-of whom her mother
disapproved-and wanted an excuse for the pregnancy.1 0 '
At in camera hearings, defense counsel elicited evidence from
both the complainant and other witnesses that the complainant had
expressed to her friend the fear that she was pregnant and that her
mother would disapprove of her pregnancy. 0 2 The complainant
further testified, however, that she had several menstrual periods
between the time she expressed her fear of being pregnant and the
alleged sexual assault.' 0 3 The trial court, accepting the complain-
ant's testimony, excluded the in camera testimony for failure to show
a motive to fabricate, reasoning that the menstrual periods removed
any fear of pregnancy.
10 4
The Illinois Appellate Court reversed, holding that the trial
court's exclusion of the motive evidence was "manifestly prejudi-
cial" to the defendant.10 5 The court reasoned that the proffered evi-
dence was critical to the defense's theory that the complainant was
fabricating the sexual assault charges.' 0 6 Therefore, the trial court's
refusal to allow the motive evidence violated the defendant's right
to confront adverse witnesses under the Illinois t0 7 and United
States Constitutions.1
0 8
Thus, Illinois courts recognize the admissibility of evidence
concerning a complainant's past sexual behavior when offered to
prove her motive to fabricate sexual offense charges. However, the
use of sexual conduct evidence to establish a motive to fabricate is
not free from attack. Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 of the Canadian
Supreme Court argues that the relevancy of past sexual conduct of-
98 See People v. Gray, 568 N.E.2d 219 (Ill. App. 1991).
99 Id.
100 Id. See ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, para. 115-7 (1989).
101 Gray, 568 N.E.2d at 219.
102 Id. at 221-23.
103 Id. at 222.
104 Id. The court did not base its ruling on the application of the rape shield statute.
Rather, the court held that the defense had failed to lay a proper foundation for a prior
inconsistent statement during the complainant's cross-examination.
105 Id. at 223.
106 Id.
107 ILL. CONST. 1970, art. I, § 8 ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have
the right ... to meet the witnesses face to face .... ).
108 U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.").
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fered to prove a motive to fabricate merely promotes a different
stereotype of women: "that they lie about sexual assault and that
women who allege sexual assault often do so in order to get back in
the good graces of those who may have her sexual conduct under
scrutiny." 0 9 If, indeed, this stereotype drives motive evidence, then
acceptance of the evidence would seemingly turn back the clock to
the days where society viewed sexual assault complainants with
skepticism, fearing that these women might falsely accuse men of a
sexual offense to conceal their promiscuity or as a tool of spite.' 10
Motive evidence, however, does not derive its strength from the
notion that women usually, or even often, lie about sexual assault.
Rather, motive evidence merely permits an inference of fabrication
by providing specific facts to support the context of that suggestion.
Indeed, the argument that such evidence must be precluded to
avoid another female stereotype is itself overbroad. The suggestion
that sexual conduct evidence would never be relevant to the com-
plainant's motive to fabricate sexual assault charges necessarily re-
lies on the presumption that women would never lie about sexual
assault to conceal sexual activity, notwithstanding specific evidence
suggesting fabrication.II x Consider again People v. Gray:11 2 Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6 could not entirely rule out the possibility that the
alleged victim fabricated the complaint in order to conceal the fact
that she was sleeping with her boyfriend, given her statements to
friends expressing fear of her mother's disapproval.' 3 Nor could
the jurist maintain that the only evidentiary weight this motive evi-
dence holds is a general stereotype about women, in light of the
defendant's specific evidence relating to fabrication.
Moreover, the fact that motive evidence is comprised of a com-
plainant's past sexual activity is simply incidental. The sexual con-
duct evidence is relevant only insofar as it is part of a theory
detailing how the complainant formed the motive to lie about the
alleged sexual assault. However, to say that the existence of sexual
activity is not the focus of the explanation is not to say that the the-
ory could be just as effective without the sexual activity.11 4 If this
motive evidence were admissible only to the extent that it did not
109 Seaboyer v. The Queen, File No. 20666, at 219 (Can. Supreme Ct. 1991)
(L'Heureux-Dub&, J., dissenting).
110 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
III See, e.g., Gray, 568 N.E.2d at 221-23.
112 568 N.E.2d 219; see supra note 98 and accompanying text.
113 See Gray, 568 N.E.2d at 221-23.
114 In some cases, the complainant's bias may be demonstrated without introducing
the past sexual conduct that is part of the defense's theory. See People v. Newman, 462
N.E.2d 731 (Ill. App. 1984) (holding that evidence that the defendant kicked complain-
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include sexual conduct, the probative value of the evidence would
be greatly diminished. In People v. Gray, the defendant would be re-
duced to saying, in effect, "The complainant had a reason to fabri-
cate this sexual assault charge, but I can't say why or produce any
corroborating evidence."' 1 5 Obviously, this empty argument would
not convince most juries that the complainant had a motive to lie.
The preclusion of the past sexual conduct evidence would deny the
defendant his right to expose the witness's bias or motive to fabri-
cate; 116 to deny him a convincing and integral part of the defense,
by omitting any reference to sexual conduct, would be to effectively
deny him the defense altogether. 1 7
Therefore, the Illinois rape shield statute should be amended to
incorporate an exception already recognized by the state's courts:
the admission of evidence of past sexual behavior to show the com-
plainant's motive to fabricate sexual offense charges." 8 While such
evidence would reflect upon the credibility of the complainant, it
would not rely on the propensity inference or other manipulative
sexual stereotypes. Instead, this challenge to a complainant's verac-
ity would draw its evidentiary weight from specific facts which show
that the complainant has a motive to fabricate the charges of sexual
assault.
C. PROOF OF ALTERNATIVE SOURCE OF EXPERIENTIAL KNOWLEDGE OF
SEXUAL CONDUCT
When a defendant is charged with sexual misconduct with a mi-
nor, 119 he may wish to offer evidence of the complainant's past sex-
ual conduct to explain the minor's ability to describe sexual acts.
ant out of his home is sufficient to establish bias, without additional evidence that de-
fendant kicked complainant out because she was a prostitute).
115 See Seaboyer v. The Queen, File No. 20666, at 77 (Can. Supreme Ct. 1991).
116 See People v. Triplett, 485 N.E.2d 9 (Ill. 1985) (when defendant attempts to ex-
pose witness's bias to testify favorably for prosecution, defendant's right to confront his
witnesses trumps policy of state to exclude evidence ofjuvenile crimes.). See also Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (defendant is entitled to confront his witnesses con-
cerning possible motive to fabricate testimony to protect his probationary status,
notwithstanding state policy against use of juvenile records for impeachment).
117 Doherty, supra note 25, at 67 ("If the evidentiary bricks needed to build a defence
are denied the accused, then for that accused the defence has been abrogated as surely
as it would be if the defence itself was held to be unavailable to him.").
118 Evidence of past sexual behavior offered to prove motive could consist of past
sexual conduct between the complainant and the accused, which Illinois's rape shield
statute already allows.
119 According to a recent study, the majority of sexual assaults occur during child-
hood and adolescence. On average, 29% of all forcible sexual assaults occur when the
victim is less than 11 years old, while another 32% occur between the ages of 11 and 17.
Rape in America, supra note 14, at 3.
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Where the complainant possesses detailed knowledge of sexual con-
duct at a very young age, the jury could infer that this knowledge
emanated from the defendant's alleged sexual activity with the mi-
nor. This proposition was perhaps best articulated by the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire: "[T]he average juror would perceive the
average twelve-year-old as a sexual innocent. Therefore, it is prob-
able that jurors would believe that the sexual experience she de-
scribes must have occurred in connection with the incident being
prosecuted; otherwise, she could not have described it. ' ' 120
Illinois courts recognize the relevancy of evidence offered to ex-
plain a complainant's independent knowledge of sexual activity. 121
However, unlike a case where this knowledge emanates from view-
ing pornographic videos, 122 the Illinois courts are not willing to ad-
mit such evidence when the knowledge is derived from previous
sexual experience. For example, the defendant in People v. Cam-
pos 123 attempted to introduce evidence that the eleven-year-old
complainant, through previous sexual conduct, had gained knowl-
edge of sex prior to the alleged encounter with the defendant.
124
The trial court excluded the evidence of such past sexual conduct
under the Illinois rape shield statute, and the defendant was ulti-
mately convicted. 125 An Illinois appellate court affirmed, rejecting
the defendant's contention that evidence of the complainant's past
sexual conduct should be admissible to prove the complainant's in-
dependent knowledge of sex. 126 The court dismissed this evidence
as an "irrelevant [matter] with little or no probative value."'
127
The holding in Campos is inconsistent with the thesis of this
comment, that evidence of the complainant's prior sexual conduct
should be admissible where it does not rely on the propensity infer-
ence for its relevancy. 128 The inference of propensity to consent
120 State v. Howard, 426 A.2d 457, 462 (N.H. 1981) (Brock, J.).
121 See People v. Mason, 578 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. 1991). In Mason, a defendant on
trial for criminal sexual assault of a seven-year-old girl attempted to explain the com-
plainant's knowledge of sexual activity by introducing evidence that the complainant had
watched pornographic videos. The trial court excluded the evidence, and the defendant
was convicted of two counts of criminal sexual assault. An appellate court of Illinois
reversed, holding that such evidence was critical to the defense's theory that sexual con-
duct between the complainant and the defendant never took place.
122 See id.
123 507 N.E.2d 1342 (Ill. App. 1987).




128 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. The appellate court in Campos deferred
to the findings of the trial court regarding the weight of the sexual conduct evidence.
However, without addressing the content of the proffered knowledge evidence, the ap-
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does not arise when evidence of a minor's past sexual conduct is
introduced in Illinois because state law does not acknowledge a mi-
nor's capacity to consent to sexual conduct.' 29 A defendant 30 is
pellate court continually characterized the evidence as "irrelevant," implying that the
evidence could under no circumstances be relevant. This insensitivity to the defendant's
rights is especially shocking considering that the court, rather than simply deferring to
the statute, recognized its power to create an exception to the rape shield statute when
necessary to ensure "the integrity of the fact-finding process." People v. Campos, 507
N.E.2d 1342, 1348 (Ill. App. 1987) (quoting Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 315
(1969)). Despite this recognition, the court nonetheless failed to recognize an exception
that did not fall within the traditionally-protected evidentiary areas of interest, bias or
motive to testify falsely. Id. at 1349.
129 People v. Barfield, 543 N.E.2d 157, 161 (Ill. App. 1989) (consent of minor victim is
not a valid defense to a charge of criminal sexual assault of complainant under 13 years
of age); In Interest of C.K.M., 481 N.E.2d 883, 888 (Il. App. 1985) (six-year-old girl is
conclusively presumed to be unable to legally consent to an act of carnal knowledge).
Where each of the four Illinois Criminal Code sections on sexual offenses addresses
sexual activity with minors, none requires that the sexual act take place "by the use of
force or threat of force," thereby precluding the consent defense:
Criminal Sexual Assault. [a] The accused commits criminal sexual assault if he
or she: .. . [3] commits an act of sexual penetration with a complainant who was
under 18 years of age when the act was committed and the accused was a family
member; or [4] commits an act of sexual penetration with a victim who was at least
13 years of age but under 18 years of age when the act was committed and the
accused was 17 years of age or over and held a position of trust, authority or super-
vision in relation to the victim ... ;
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-13(a)(3), (4) (1988)
Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault ... [b] The accused commits aggravated
criminal sexual assault if. [1] the accused was 17 years of age or over and commits
an act of sexual penetration with a victim who was under 13 years of age when the
act was committed; or [2] the accused was under 17 years of age and [i] commits an
act of sexual penetration with a victim who was under 9 years of age when the act
was committed ... ;
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-14(b)(1), (2) (1988)
Criminal Sexual Abuse .. .[b] The accused commits criminal sexual abuse if
the accused was under 17 years of age and commits an act of sexual penetration or
sexual conduct with a victim who was at least 9 years of age but under 17 years of
age when the act was committed. [c] The accused commits criminal sexual abuse if
he or she commits an act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct with a victim who
was at least 13 years of age but under 17 years of age and the accused was less than
5 years older than the victim ... ;
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-15(b), (c) (1988)
Aggravated Criminal Sexual Abuse . . . [b] The accused commits aggravated
criminal sexual abuse if he or she commits an act of sexual conduct with a complain-
ant who was under 18 years of age when the act was committed and the accused was
a family member. [c] The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if: [1]
the accused was 17 years of age or over and [i] commits an act of sexual conduct
with a victim who was under 13 years of age when the act was committed ... ; [2]
the accused was under 17 years of age and [i] commits an act of sexual conduct with
a victim who was under 9 years of age when the act was committed . . . ; [d] The
accused commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if he or she commits an act of
sexual penetration or sexual conduct with a victim who was at least 13 years of age
but under 17 years of age and the accused was at least 5 years older than the victim
[.. ; [f] The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if he or she commits
an act of sexual conduct with a victim who was at least 13 years of age but under 18
years of age when the act was committed and the accused was 17 years of age or
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guilty of a sexual offense if he engages in sexual activity with a mi-
nor, regardless of the minor's willingness to participate.13 ' Thus,
the propensity inference is inapplicable, and the admission of evi-
dence of the complainant's past sexual behavior to explain her in-
dependent knowledge of sex is consistent with the spirit of the
Illinois rape shield statute.i32
In opposition to the use of knowledge evidence, one jurist has
suggested that the relevancy of this evidence is rooted in the myth
that females of any age lie about sexual assault.133 This argument is
misplaced, for two reasons. First, a very young complainant could
easily be confused about the occurrence of sexual abuse, in contrast
to a child who attempts to manipulate her sexual activity against the
accused.' 34 Because of a child's potential misunderstanding of
events, the evidence of past sexual activity is not necessarily offered
to prove that the complainant is lying.' 35 Second, rather than an
attempt to "sling mud" at the complainant, the introduction of prior
sexual experience evidence is a defensive response to the almost in-
over and held a position of trust, authority or supervision in relation to the
victim....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16(b), (c), (d), (f) (1988).
130 This comment assumes for these purposes that the defendant, in a case involving
sexual conduct with a minor, is himself of the requisite age to be charged with the crime.
For a description of the age requirements of the defendant in sexual offense crimes, see
supra note 129.
131 See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-17 (consent may be raised as defense only to
those offenses where force or threat of force is an element). The one defense available
to the defendant, in limited cases, would be that he reasonably believed that the com-
plainant was of age to legally consent. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-17(b).
132 This discussion is concerned solely with the inference of propensity in sexual con-
duct evidence; it does not address the compelling concern of children who may be sub-
jected to potentially devastating probes into memories of sexual abuse. See People v.
Arenda, 330 N.W.2d 814, 818 (Mich. 1982) (quoted in Galvin, supra note 4, at 867
n.491) Such trauma is particularly exacting when past sexual conduct evidence is of-
fered to show knowledge of sex: when the defense attempts to explain that the com-
plainant has independent means for her ability to vividly describe the alleged sexual
encounter, the details of the proffered sexual conduct evidence must be sufficiently spe-
cific to correspond to the details of the complainant's testimony. Despite the inevitable
trauma to the child, courts have acknowledged that the defendant's right to confront
witnesses with highly probative evidence must not be curtailed. See State v Howard, 426
A.2d 457, 460 (N.H. 1981). Further, the defense will attempt to admit knowledge evi-
dence, in most cases, only after the child has testified to the alleged sexual encounter
with the defendant. Consequently, the harm caused by this line of inquiry, while dis-
turbing to the child, would merely be incremental.
'33 Seaboyer v. The Queen, File No. 20666, at 219 (Can. Supreme Ct. 1991)
(L'Heureux-Dub6, J., dissenting).
134 For a case involving a "spiteful" complainant, see State v.Jalo, 557 P.2d 1359 (Or.
App. 1976) (en banc) (complainant was ten years old).
135 If the defense offered this knowledge evidence to argue that the complainant was
lying, it should be required, as a prerequisite to admissibility, to offer evidence of a
motive to lie. See infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text for discussion of this point.
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escapable inference that arises from the complainant's testimony:
the belief that the only reason the young complainant can describe
these sexual acts is because the defendant engaged in these acts with
the complainant.
Once the decision is made that a minor's prior experiential
knowledge of sex should be admissible as evidence, however, there
remains the vital question of the age at which a complainant
achieves the intellectual maturity to provide a detailed description
of a sexual encounter without having engaged in one herself. After
the complainant has reached such an age, the presumption that the
knowledge is attributable to the defendant's misconduct should not
be present because the complainant would simply be aware of sex-
ual activity from the outside world. For example, one might expect
that a twenty-year-old woman in modern society could be able to
provide a fairly detailed description of a sexual encounter, even if
this woman has never engaged in the act herself. But what of a
twelve-year-old? An eight-year-old?
The Illinois sexual offense statutes provide some guidance on
this issue. The age ceilings these statutes impose upon a child's
ability to legally consent to sexual acts are either eighteen, 3 6 seven-
teen, 13 7 thirteen' 38 or nine,139 depending on the age of the accused
and the relationship of the accused to the complainant. The admis-
sibility of past sexual conduct evidence to explain the complainant's
knowledge of sex should mirror these age requirements. By follow-
ing the same age requirement as that for the sexual offense, sexual
conduct evidence will only be admitted where the complainant is le-
gally incapable of giving consent. In this way, evidence of a minor's
past sexual experience could not rely on the invidious inference of
propensity to consent.
However, this limit on the use of knowledge evidence should
act only as the outer boundary of admissibility; that is, although the
evidence would be admissible only in cases where the complainant is
legally incapable of giving consent, the evidence should not be ad-
missible in every such case. The court should have discretion to ad-
136 See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-13(a)(3), (4) (1988); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 12-16(b), (f) (1988). For a reading of these portions of the statutes, see supra note
129.
137 See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-15(b), (c) (1988); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
12-16(c)(1)(ii), (c)(2)(ii) (d), (f) (1988). For a reading of these portions of the statutes,
see supra note 129.
138 See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-14(b)(1) (1988); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
12-16(c)(1)(i) (1988). For a reading of these portions of the statutes, see supra note 129.
139 See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-14(b)(2)(i) (1988); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
12-16(c)(2)(i) (1988). For a reading of these portions of the statutes, see supra note 129.
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mit or bar such evidence because a minor's ability to understand
and relate sexual encounters will vary from one complainant to an-
other. If the court finds that the jury could infer that the complain-
ant would not otherwise be knowledgeable about sex absent
conduct with the accused, the court could allow the evidence to re-
but this inference. If, however, the court considered the jury aware
that the complainant could otherwise have knowledge of sexual ac-
tivity, the court could exclude the evidence as unnecessary. 140
In order to justify introducing evidence of a complainant's prior
sexual knowledge, the defendant should be required to explain its
necessity at an in camera offer of proof. The defendant should first
inform the court that he wishes to introduce evidence of the com-
plainant's past sexual conduct to explain her prior knowledge of
sexual acts. Second, the defendant should specify whether he is
claiming that the complainant deliberately fabricated the story, or
that she simply is confused about whether the incident occurred or
with whom it occurred. If the defendant is offering the evidence to
show that the complainant is lying, he must be able to offer cor-
roborating evidence, in the form of past sexual conduct or any other
evidence, that the complainant has a bias or motive to lie. In fram-
ing these requirements for admissibility, the court will preserve the
defendant's constitutional right to present relevant evidence while
preventing a defendant from merely seizing an opportunity to intim-
idate the complainant with highly sensitive evidence.
Notwithstanding the Illinois Appellate Court's holding in People
v. Campos,14 1 Illinois law should allow evidence of a minor's prior
140 To illustrate, contrast a case involving a 16-year-old complainant alleging vaginal
intercourse with a 5-year-old complainant alleging anal intercourse. The court might
determine it is reasonable that a 16-year-old girl is capable of describing an act of vagi-
nal intercourse without having engaged in sexual activity previously. In such a case, the
court would find no inference that the defendant must be responsible for the complain-
ant's knowledge, and in its discretion the court would not allow knowledge evidence.
On the other hand, in the case of the 5-year-old describing an act of anal intercourse,
the court would undoubtedly find that evidence of the complainant's prior experiential
knowledge, if offered, would be necessary to rebut a very real inference that the defend-
ant must have committed the alleged act on the complainant.
Because each child's environment is unique, it would be nearly impossible to pre-
dict exactly which factors a court would consider in determining whether the inference
necessitating knowledge evidence exists. Such factors might include whether the com-
plainant's peers are sexually active, whether the complainant has seen sexually explicit
images in films or periodicals, and whether the complainant has learned about sexual
intercourse through conversation or formal education.
141 507 N.E.2d 1342 (Ill. App. 1987) (holding that evidence of 11-year-old complain-
ant's sexual experience prior to sexual assault, offered to show source of complainant's




sexual activity when offered to explain the child's independent
knowledge of sexual activity. Such evidence could only be offered
to rebut ajudicially recognized inference that the defendant's sexual
abuse is responsible for the complainant's sexual knowledge. The
admissibility of evidence of the complainant's prior experiential
knowledge of sexual activity is consistent with the spirit of the Illi-
nois rape shield statute, as it does not rely for its relevancy on the
propensity inference.
D. PROOF OF CONSENT
When there is no dispute concerning the occurrence of the in-
tercourse at issue, the defense may attempt to introduce evidence of
the complainant's past sexual conduct to show her consent on this
occasion. Under Illinois law, the defense of consent 42 can be
raised 143 for any sexual offense charge in which the use or threat of
force is an element of the crime.144
Either side in a sexual assault trial may raise the issue of con-
sent. For example, the prosecution may elicit testimony that the
complainant was a virgin prior to the alleged attack or that she is a
homosexual, both of which imply that the complainant did not con-
sent to sexual activity with the accused. The defendant could then
attempt to rebut this inference with conflicting evidence of the com-
plainant's past sexual conduct.
The defense may attempt to introduce evidence that the com-
plainant is a prostitute to show either that the complainant is pro-
miscuous and likely consented or that the alleged attack was itself an
act of prostitution. In other cases, the defense may wish to offer
evidence of a pattern of the complainant's sexual activity that, when
142 In Illinois, "consent" to sexual activity is defined as "a freely given agreement to
the act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct in question. Lack of verbal or physical
resistance or submission by the victim resulting from the use of force or threat of force
by the accused shall not constitute consent." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-17(a)
(1989).
143 See supra note 129, for a list of provisions in the Illinois statutes where consent is
not available as a defense. Aside from those provisions, the issue of consent is present in
sexual offenses.
144 See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-17(a) (1989) ("It shall be a defense to any
offense under Section 12-13 through 12-16 of this Code where force or threat offorce is an
element of the offense that the complainant consented.") (emphasis added). Under these
sections of the law, the prosecution carries the burden at trial of demonstrating that the
sexual act was committed by the defendant with the use of force or threat of force. See,
e.g., People v. Coleman, 520 N.E.2d 55 (Ill. App. 1987) (reversing conviction under ag-
gravated criminal sexual assault statute for court's failure to instruct jury on state's bur-
den to prove lack of consent).
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considered in relation to the sexual act at issue, implies that the
complainant consented to sexual activity with the defendant.
Unlike the uses of sexual conduct evidence previously dis-
cussed-evidence offered to explain the complainant's physical con-
dition, 45 establish a complainant's motive to fabricate the sexual
assault charges 146 and provide an alternative source for the com-
plainant's sexual knowledge147-evidence relating to consent will
rely for its relevancy on an inference closely related to, if not indis-
tinguishable from, the propensity inference. In order to consist-
ently recognize the propensity inference when considering consent
evidence, rather subtle nuances between various inferences must be
solidified.
For example, this comment will distinguish between evidence
of conscious and unconscious decisionmaking in sexual choices, ar-
guing that evidence of prior conscious sexual choices relies on the
unreliable propensity inference, as opposed to evidence of prior un-
conscious decisionmaking. Accordingly, this comment will argue
against the admissibility of evidence of a complainant's virginity
prior to the alleged sexual assault, 148 as abstinence is a conscious
choice; likewise, this comment will advocate the admissibility of evi-
dence of a complainant's homosexuality, 149 which is widely believed
to be an unconscious choice.
This comment will also discuss a proposed distinction between
evidence focusing on the mere existence of a complainant's sexual
background from evidence relating to the specific and unique cir-
cumstances surrounding that sexual conduct which amount to a pat-
tern of sexual behavior. This comment will argue against the
admission of evidence of a complainant's sexual background to
prove consent, notwithstanding the specificity of the surrounding
circumstances, as it nonetheless attempts to predict a complainant's
sexual behavior based on prior action.1
50
1. Proof of Virginity
Evidence of the complainant's virginity may be offered by the
prosecution' 5 ' to imply that the complainant did not consent to sex-
145 See supra notes 58-95 and accompanying text.
146 See supra notes 96-118 and accompanying text.
147 See supra notes 119-41 and accompanying text.
148 See infra notes 151-67 and accompanying text.
149 See infra notes 168-81 and accompanying text.
150 See infra notes 201-22 and accompanying text.
151 This testimony would usually come from the complainant or a doctor. See, e.g.,
People v. Sales, 502 N.E.2d 1221 (Ill. App. 1986) (testimony of complainant); People v.
Stephens, 310 N.E.2d 824 (Ill. App. 1974) (medical testimony).
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ual relations with the defendant.' 52 This comment will conclude
that evidence of a lack of prior of sexual activity offered to prove
non-consent relies on the propensity inference and is properly ex-
cluded by the Illinois rape shield statute.
An Illinois appellate court has held that evidence of a complain-
ant's virginity prior to the alleged sexual assault is inadmissible
under the Illinois rape shield statute. 153 The Illinois Supreme Court
reinforced this conclusion by implication four years later.' 54 The
complainant in People v. Sandoval'55 testified that she had never en-
gaged in anal sex with anyone other than the defendant prior to the
alleged sexual assault. 15 6 The defense sought to rebut this testi-
mony with evidence that the complainant had, in fact, engaged in
anal sex with others in the past. 157 The Illinois Supreme Court held
that the rape shield statute barred both the complainant's testimony
and the defense's rebuttal evidence, reasoning that evidence of a
lack of past sexual activity fell within the rape shield's prohibition
against "prior sexual activity ... of the alleged victim."' 58
Subsequently, an Illinois appellate court interpreted Sandoval to
prohibit evidence that the complainant never consummated her
marriage. 159 Thus, although no Illinois court has directly addressed
evidence regarding the virginity of a sexual assault complainant, ap-
pellate court holdings indicate that the rape shield statute would bar
such evidence. Evidence of the complainant's abstinence with re-
gard to a particular form of sexual activity-for example, that the
complainant never had anal sex with third persons16 0-or with re-
152 See Galvin, supra note 4, at 854 ("Arguably, evidence of virginity... may be rele-
vant to the issue of consent."). In some cases, a complainant's virginity could be raised
indirectly through the use of physical evidence. For example, the prosecution may in-
troduce evidence of the complainant's torn hymenal membrane, an injury suggesting
that the complainant was previously a virgin. However, if such a case arises, rebuttal
evidence of the complainant's past sexual behavior should be allowed to explain the
source of physical consequence. Assuming this evidence took the form of past sexual
intercourse, the inference of virginity would be rebutted. Therefore, the need to specifi-
cally address the issue of virginity would be avoided.
153 See Sales, 502 N.E.2d 1221 (holding that testimony of the complainant's virginity
was prohibited by the Illinois rape shield statute).
154 See People v. Sandoval, 552 N.E.2d 726 (Ill. 1990). For a more complete discus-
sion of Sandoval, see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
155 552 N.E.2d 726 (Ill. 1990).
156 Id. at 728.
157 Id. at 728.
158 Id. at 731; see ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-7(a) (1989).
159 People v. Kemblowski, 559 N.E.2d 247, 250 (Ill. App. 1990). The court quoted
language in Sandoval that the Illinois rape shield law "leaves no room for introduction of
reputation or specific act evidence from any party in the action." Id. (quoting Sandoval,
552 N.E.2d at 731).
160 See Sandoval, 552 N.E.2d at 726.
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gard to a specific individual-for example, that she never had sex
with her husband' 6 1-is simply an abbreviated form of virginity evi-
dence, which speaks to the entirety of the complainant's life with
regard to all forms of sexual activity.
The Illinois courts' prohibition of virginity evidence 162 is con-
sistent with the rejection of the propensity inference. By implying
that the complainant did not consent to sexual relations with the
defendant because she had not yet ever consented to sex, virginity
evidence relies on a propensity-not-to-consent inference, a close rel-
ative of the traditional propensity theory. While this inference may
not harm the complainant at trial, 163 such a generalization nonethe-
less offends the modern recognition of a woman's autonomy in
choosing whether to engage in sexual activity. If society is to ac-
knowledge a woman's autonomy in sexual activity,' 64 its laws must
reject the inference that a chaste woman would not consent to sex as
forcefully as current laws reject the notion that an unchaste woman
would consent. 165 With the mandate to exclude evidence of a com-
plainant's virginity, 166 Illinois courts have replaced an unjust pro-
pensity inference with a neutral proposition: the belief that whether
or not the complainant has been sexually active in the past is irrele-
vant to the issue of her consent in the present case. 167
161 See Kemblowski, 559 N.E.2d 247.
162 This comment will assume hereinafter that, in light of its previous holdings relat-
ing to evidence of abstinence, Illinois courts reject virginity evidence as violative of the
state rape shield statute.
163 The same may not be true of the defendant, however. See Berger, supra note 4, at
67 ("A vision of ravaged innocence may inflame the jurors against the defendant as
much as an image of tarnished experience sets them against the complaining witness.").
164 This comment argues for legal recognition of a woman's autonomy in making de-
cisions regarding her sexual conduct.
165 But see Commonwealth v. McKay, 294 N.E.2d 213, 218 (Mass. 1973) (reasoning that
evidence of virginity is far more probative of non-consent than is lack of virginity proba-
tive of consent), cited in Galvin, supra note 4, at 854.
166 Professor Galvin, in her thoughtful article on rape shield law reform, argues that
the use of virginity evidence does not rely on the "invidious inferences" that rape shield
legislation has sought to avoid. Galvin, supra note 4, at 858. Galvin correctly notes that
such evidence does not imply a "likelihood that the complainant consented;" if any-
thing, this evidence implies exactly the opposite. However, this comment argues for a
broader definition of the "invidious inference" of propensity, one which includes any
attempt to determine, from a woman's past discretionary decisions and subjectivity,
whether she consents or does not consent to sex in general. Because evidence of virgin-
ity relies on this modified inference, such evidence must be rejected.
167 A more practical reason for excluding evidence of a complainant's virginity is that
such evidence inevitably and necessarily invites rebuttal in the form of potentially preju-
dicial past sexual conduct evidence. Because the complainant's virginity should not be
relevant anyway, there is no reason to provide the defense with an excuse to bring in




2. Proof of Sexual Orientation
In a sexual assault trial where the defense argues that the sexual
activity was consensual, the state may attempt to introduce evidence
that the complainant's sexual orientation conflicts with a finding
that the complainant consented to sexual relations. For example, if
the complainant were a lesbian and the accused were male, the pros-
ecution would try to show that the complainant's sexual orientation
proves that she did not consent to sex with the defendant. 68
Because evidence of the complainant's sexual orientation is
suggestive of her prior sexual choices, such evidence arguably falls
within the definition of "prior sexual activity" under the rape shield
statute.169 This comment will conclude, however, that evidence of
the complainant's sexual orientation 170 does not rely on the propen-
sity inference, as the sexual activity is guided by an inherent trait,
rather than conscious discretionary choices. In reaching this con-
clusion, this comment will rely on current medical research that sug-
gests that a person's sexual orientation is beyond a person's
conscious control.
An Illinois appellate court, in considering the propriety of evi-
dence of the complainant's sexual orientation, held that the admis-
sion of such evidence violated the Illinois rape shield statute. 171 In
People v. Kemblowski, 172 the trial court admitted the complainant's tes-
timony on direct examination that she was a lesbian, 173 and the de-
fendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault. 174 An
Illinois appellate court reversed, holding that the Illinois rape shield
statute barred evidence of the complainant's sexual orientation. 175
In determining the propriety of the holding in Kemblowski, that
168 See, e.g., People v. Kemblowski, 559 N.E.2d 247 (Ill. App. 1990). In maintaining
consistency with the male-defendant, female-complainant scenario assumed throughout
this comment, the lesbian complainant and male defendant will be considered in this
discussion. Clearly, any combination of accused and complainants could exist. In cases
of homosexual sexual assault, the sexual orientation evidence would consist of the com-
plainant's heterosexuality.
169 See ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 38, para. 115-7 (1989); see also Kemblowski, 559 N.E.2d 247
(evidence that complainant is lesbian is prohibited under Illinois rape shield statute).
170 The conclusion this comment reaches would not apply to bisexuals, whose attrac-
tions are not firmly attached to one gender.
171 See Kemblowski, 559 N.E.2d 247.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 249-50. The prosecution argued that evidence of the complainant's lesbian-
ism did not violate the rape shield statute because it referred to the complainant's sexual
status, rather than her sexual behavior. Id. at 250.
174 Id. at 249; see ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-14(a) (1985).
175 Kemblowski, 559 N.E.2d at 250. In so holding, the appellate court reasoned that
admission of homosexuality, "by definition, pertains to the witness' sexual activities with
another of the same gender." Id.
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evidence of the complainant's sexual orientation is inadmissible
under the Illinois rape shield statute, this comment will next con-
sider whether evidence of a complainant's sexual orientation relies
on the propensity inference. In this analysis, this comment will
compare sexual orientation evidence to evidence of the complain-
ant's virginity prior to the alleged sexual assault,' 76 as each form of
evidence ultimately reaches the inference of non-consent. However,
this comment will conclude that, while evidence of a complainant's
virginity should be prohibited, sexual orientation evidence should
be admitted. This comment will base its conclusion that sexual ori-
entation evidence does not rely on the propensity inference on two
assumptions: that sexual orientation is an inherent trait that an indi-
vidual does not consciously choose,1 77 and that an individual cannot
control or change one's sexual orientation.' 78 These assumptions
are consistent with current medical research on these issues.
Evidence of sexual orientation is analogous to virginity evi-
dence in that both suggest non-consent. However, although the in-
ferences reach the same conclusion, the source of the suggestion and
the route the evidence takes in reaching the inference differ between
the two forms of evidence.
Evidence of a complainant's virginity relies on the theory that a
woman who has abstained from sex prior to the alleged sexual as-
sault probably did not consent to the sexual activity with the ac-
cused. 179 The source of this suggestion is the belief that a review of
a woman's prior conscious decisions regarding sexual activity is pre-
dictive of the decision she will make on a subsequent occasion.
176 See supra notes 151-67 and accompanying text.
177 While there is not yet a clear consensus on the origin of the development of sexual
proclivities in a person, it is widely believed that such a sexual preference is an uncon-
scious choice made by the person. The conflict among researchers today centers around
whether homosexuality begins in the chromosomes or during the person's adolescence,
the so-called "nature versus nurture" argument. However, either of these possibilities
leads to a conclusion that the person does not make a conscious choice about his sexual
orientation. See Marion H. Lewis, Unacceptable Risk or Unacceptable Rhetoric? An Argument
for a Quasi-Suspect Classification for Gays Based on Current Government Security Clearance Proce-
dures, 7J. L. & POL. 133, 165 (1990) ("Even absent a consensus that individuals are born
gay, most research has found that the choice that determines one's sexual orientation is
made very early in life, usually by a person's fifth birthday."); see also David Gelman et al.,
Born or Bred?, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 24, 1992, at 46-53.
178 See HARRIS M. MILLER II, NoTE, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection
Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 797, 817-18
(1984) (research indicates that a person's sexual orientation is virtually impervious to
change); Dr. T. Sarbin & Dr. K. Karols, Defense Personnel Security Research and Educa-
tion Center, Nonconforming Sexual Orientations and Military Suitability, at 1 (1988) ("[The]
desired gender of the sex partner is fixed or at least firmly conditioned by biological
preparation and habits laid down early in life.").
179 See supra notes 151-67 and accompanying text.
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Clearly, the propensity inference empowers this evidence.' 80
Evidence of sexual orientation, on the other hand, relies on the
reasoning that a lesbian did not consent to sexual activity with the
accused because she is not sexually attracted to men. The source of
this belief is the view that a lesbian does not consciously choose her
sexual attractions insofar as they concern with which gender she will
desire sexual intimacy. This inference does not rely on propensity,
for it does not base its conclusion on prior discretionary actions. In-
stead, evidence of sexual orientation predicts a individual's lack of
consent based on an inherent characteristic of that individual.
Unlike virginity evidence, evidence of sexual orientation is con-
sistent with the recognition of female sexual autonomy. The fact
that a woman was a virgin prior to the sexual encounter with the
defendant should not preclude the possibility that she might have
chosen to engage in sexual intercourse with the defendant; to draw
this conclusion would be to take away a woman's autonomy to make
important personal choices, such as the decision to engage in her
first act of sexual intercourse. On the other hand, a woman's homo-
sexuality, while it does not predict with whom she will have sex, dic-
tates the gender of the persons with whom she will be sexually active.
This conclusion does not offend female autonomy, but rather relies
on medical findings to merely suggest that the individuals with
whom a woman will exercise her sexual autonomy are women, not
men.' 8 '
This distinction between virginity evidence and sexual orienta-
tion evidence is necessary. If society is to recognize the subjectivity
of a woman's sexual choices by banning suggestive past conduct, it
should do so consistently by excluding evidence of the complain-
ant's virginity. At the same time, however, probative evidence such
as a complainant's sexual orientation that does not depend on pro-
pensity for its relevancy should be admitted in Illinois sexual offense
cases.
3. Evidence of Prostitution
A defendant on trial for a sexual offense may also attempt to
introduce evidence that the complainant is or has been a prosti-
tute. 8 2 A defendant may use this evidence to imply that the com-
180 See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
181 See supra notes 177-78.
182 See, e.g., State v. Ivory, 487 N.E.2d 1035 (Ill. App. 1985); People v. Newman, 462
N.E.2d 731 (Ill. App. 1984); People v. Hughes, 460 N.E.2d 485 (Ill. App. 1984); People
v. Buford, 441 N.E.2d 1235 (Ill. App. 1982).
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plainant is not a credible witness,18 3 to establish the witness's bias1 84
or to show that the complainant likely consented to the sexual activ-
ity with the defendant.18 5 The use of the complainant's prostitution
to impeach the credibility of the complainant is unreliable and out-
dated,18 6 as prostitution is not a crime that connotes dishonesty.
18 7
Evidence of the complainant's prostitution offered to show bias or
motive to lie would fall under the proposed exception of past sexual
conduct evidence probative of motive to fabricate, discussed earlier
in this comment. 18 8 Therefore, this discussion will limit itself to evi-
dence of the complainant's prostitution that is offered to prove
consent.
The use of prostitution evidence to prove consent may be em-
ployed in one of two ways. First, the defense may offer the evidence
to show that the victim is promiscuous by profession and, therefore,
more likely to have consented to the sexual activity with the defend-
ant.'8 9 However, this evidence might also suggest that the com-
plainant did not consent to free sexual conduct: the complainant
would be less likely to consent to gratis sexual activity given her
practice of exchanging sexual acts for compensation. 190 Whether or
not the evidence is damaging to the complainant, however, is not
the critical question. In order to remain faithful to the Illinois rape
shield statute, the proffered evidence must not depend for its rele-
vance upon the propensity inference. If such evidence is offered to
show that the complainant consented to sexual relations with the
defendant simply because she is promiscuous, 9 1 it should be
excluded.
Evidence of prostitution may also serve to prove that the sexual
encounter in question was itself an act of prostitution. 192 The trial
court in People v. Buford,193 relying on the Illinois rape shield statute,
forbade the defendant from introducing evidence that the sexual ac-
183 See Newman, 462 N.E.2d 731.
184 See Hughes, 460 N.E.2d 485.
185 See People v. Dixon, 513 N.E.2d 134 (Il1. App. 1987) (rejecting appellant's argu-
ment that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in part because counsel failed to
probe into complainant's history of prostitution for purposes of proving consent).
186 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
187 See People v. Montgomery, 268 N.E.2d 695 (Ill. 1971) (rejecting evidence of previ-
ous prostitution conviction as basis for impeaching credibility).
188 See supra notes 96-118 and accompanying text.
189 See People v. Williams, 330 N.W.2d 823, 830 (Mich. 1982).
190 See id.
191 See Galvin, supra note 4, at 840 (arguing that prostitution evidence is "indistin-
guishable" from evidence offered for propensity).




tivity with the complainant was actually an act of prostitution.19 4 An
Illinois appellate court affirmed, reasoning that the rape shield stat-
ute barred a probe into the complainant's sexual background. 95
Evidence of consent by prostitution is consistent with the rejec-
tion of the propensity inference typically associated with sexual as-
sault complainants. 196 The theory is not that a woman who is
sexually active probably consented to sex, but rather that a woman
who charges money for consensual sex probably charged the de-
fendant for consensual sexual services. Thus, the admission of
prostitution evidence is consistent with the thesis of this discussion.
While such an inference is not typically attributed to sexual as-
sault victims, this inference nonetheless relies on propensity for its
relevance: evidence of the complainant's prior acts of prostitution
are offered to show her likelihood to prostitute herself on a subse-
quent occasion. In Illinois, evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts
is not admissible to show propensity to act in conformity therewith
on a specific occasion; 197 proof must be limited to evidence of the
witness's general reputation for undertaking such action. s9 8 Thus,
evidence of a complainant's prior acts of prostitution would not be
admissible to suggest that she acted as a prostitute on the occasion
in question, as such evidence relies on the use of prior acts to show
propensity. 199 However, the complainant's general reputation as a
prostitute may be admissible to establish the complainant's propen-
sity to prostitute herself.
Evidence of the complainant's reputation for prostitution, when
offered to prove that the sexual encounter at issue was an act of
194 Id. at 1235-36.
195 Id.
196 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. See also State v. Gardner, 391 N.E.2d 337,
341 (Ohio 1979) (holding that complainant's reputation as prostitute would be proba-
tive where defendant claimed sexual encounter at issue was itself act of prostitution).
197 See People v. Whiters, 562 N.E.2d 325, 330 (Il1. App. 1990) (holding that trial
court committed reversible error by introducing character evidence of defendant's prior
acts of violence); People v. Mikyska, 534 N.E.2d 1348, 1354 (Ill. App. 1989) (holding
that evidence of witness's frequent use of drugs was not admissible to prove propensity
to use drugs on occasion in question); People v. Corder, 414 N.E.2d 904 (Ill. App. 1980)
(holding that trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to explore a defense witness's
particular acts of misconduct).
198 See Corder, 414 N.E.2d at 907 (" 'The reputation of a person cannot be impeached
by proof of particular acts. It must be by proving his general character for the particular
matter of misconduct in question ......."(quoting People v. Page, 6 N.E.2d 845, 847 (Ill.
1937)).
199 This prohibition of "prior acts" evidence extends to evidence of the complainant's
prior convictions for prostitution, as evidence that a witness committed other crimes is
inadmissible to show that the witness had a propensity to commit crime. People v.
Lawler, 568 N.E.2d 895, 901 (Ill. 1991).
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prostitution, does not rely on the inference that a woman's prior
sexual activity is predictive of her likelihood to consent on a subse-
quent occasion. Accordingly, where a defendant argues that the
sexual activity at issue was an act of prostitution, the Illinois rape
shield statute should include an exception for evidence of the com-
plainant's reputation as a prostitute.
2 00
4. Proof of a Pattern of Complainant's Sexual Behavior
A defendant standing trial for a sexual offense may attempt to
show consent by claiming that the sexual encounter at issue was sim-
ply another incident in a consistent pattern of sexual activity by the
complainant. This use of past sexual behavior has engendered the
most controversy, as it arguably relies on the propensity theory of
consent for its relevancy.20' If society is to recognize that women
will exercise discretion in choosing sexual partners, it is, at best, a
dangerous proposition to admit evidence of the complainant's sex-
ual past to prove her propensity to consent based on subjective fac-
tors that cannot easily be categorized. 202
This comment will conclude that evidence of a pattern of the
complainant's prior sexual activity should not be admissible in Illi-
nois law. In reaching this conclusion, this comment will reject the
argument that pattern evidence should be admissible because it fo-
cuses on the nature, rather than the existence, of prior sexual activ-
ity. Although this argument may be accurate, the resulting
inference nonetheless predicts consent based on prior consent,
notwithstanding the specificity of the surrounding circumstances.
This comment will additionally note the incongruity of Illinois
law regarding the use of prior acts to predict a complainant's con-
sent. Evidence of a defendant's prior acts of sexual violence amount-
ing to a pattern of activity may be offered on the issue of a
complainant's consent, while a complainant's prior sexual acts are
inadmissible for a similar purpose. Given the constitutional protec-
tion that the defendant enjoys in criminal trials, the courts' admis-
sion of pattern evidence against the defendant but not the
complainant raises serious due process concerns. In remaining con-
200 Thus, under the Illinois rape shield statute, the exception for evidence to show
consent by prostitution would extend to the "reputation," but not the "prior sexual
activity," of the alleged victim. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-7 (1989). However,
if the past acts of prostitution involved the accused, such evidence would be admissible
under the existing exception for "past sexual conduct ... with the accused." See ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-7 (1989).
201 Seaboyer v. The Queen, File No. 20666, at 211 (Can. Supreme Ct. 1991)
(L'Heureux-Dub6, J., dissenting).
202 See Berger, supra note 4, at 32.
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sistent with the thesis, however, this comment will argue against the
admissibility of pattern evidence, as it relies on the propensity
inference.
The call for the admissibility of specifically defined pattern evi-
dence in sexual assault cases has grown stronger in the past decade
and a half.20 3 The strongest argument for its admissibility is that,
while propensity suggestions may attach to the evidence, 20 4 evi-
dence of a sexual pattern is not based on the propensity inference. 20 5
Rather, scholars argue, the inference is that the complainant con-
sented to sex with the accused because she consented to sexual ac-
tivity several times prior to the alleged sexual assault under
circumstances highly similar to the conduct at issue.20 6 Thus, pat-
tern evidence focuses on the nature of the past sexual activity, rather
than the mere existence of "promiscuity.-
20 7
The view that pattern evidence relies on propensity was re-
cently articulated by Justice L'Heureux-Dub& of the Canadian
Supreme Court:
[Arguments favoring pattern evidence] depend for their vitality on the
notion that women consent to sex based upon such extraneous consid-
erations as the location of the act, the race, age or profession of the
alleged assaulter and/or considerations of the nature of the sexual act
engaged in .... [C]onsent is to a person and not to a circumstance.
The use of the words "pattern" and "similar fact" deny this reality.
Such arguments are implicitly based upon the notion that women will,
in the right circumstances, consent to anyone .... 208
203 See Galvin, supra note 4, at 831-48; Berger, supra note 4, at 59-61; Ordover, supra
note 4, at 110-19.
At least three states have enacted exceptions to their rape shield laws for "pattern"
evidence. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2) (West Supp. 1985) (pattern of complainant's
past sexual history admissible if so similar to encounter at issue that it is relevant to
consent); MINN. R. EVID. 404(c)(1)(A)(i) (evidence establishing common scheme of sex-
ual behavior similar to instant case is relevant to complainant's consent); N.C.R. Evrn.
412 (distinctive pattern of complainant's past sexual behavior is admissible as to consent
if pattern closely resembles encounter at issue).
204 See, e.g., Galvin, supra note 4, at 833.
205 Ordover, supra note 4, at 93, 110-19; see also Galvin, supra note 4, at 833.
206 Advocates of pattern evidence have differed in their definition of this pattern, with
sometimes wide disparity in the scope of admissible evidence. For example, while Pro-
fessor Ordover calls for evidence of the complainant's sexual conduct that is highly
analogous to the conduct in dispute, see Ordover, supra note 4, at 110, 114, Ordover
would also admit evidence of the complainant's sexual activity that constitutes "merely
one more episode in a long history of promiscuity." Galvin, supra note 4, at 833 (quot-
ing Ordover, supra note 4, at 118). Professor Galvin, on the other hand, would limit this
evidence to instances of sexual conduct whose features closely resemble those surround-
ing the alleged sexual assault. See Galvin, supra note 4, at 834.
207 See Ordover, supra note 4, at 93; see also Galvin, supra note 4, at 833.
208 Seaboyer v. The Queen, File No. 20666, at 210-11 (Can. Supreme Ct. 1991)
(L'Heureux-Dub6, J., dissenting).
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This comment has argued that the propensity inference is in-
consistent with the recognition of female sexual autonomy. Thus,
the mere existence of a complainant's prior sexual activity should
not suggest her consent on a subsequent occasion.20 9 By shifting
the focus of the evidence to the specific circumstances surrounding
the complainant's sexual activity, however, pattern evidence does
not suggest that sexual activity in general is indicative of consent.
Nonetheless, pattern evidence still relies on propensity for its rele-
vance; it simply modifies the scope of the admissible evidence.
Once the evidence defines the specific circumstances surrounding
the sexual conduct, the evidence implies that the complainant con-
sented because she consented in the past. This inference, while ad-
mittedly more reliable than the propensity inference attaching to
evidence of general sexual activity, 210 is nonetheless inconsistent
with the thesis of this comment.
Scholars have argued, however, that evidence of the complain-
ant's pattern of sexual activity could be admissible as evidence of the
complainant's modus operandi,2 11 if the conduct is sufficiently distinct
to amount to a "signature" of the complainant's sexual behavior.2 12
The traditional function of modus operandi evidence is to show iden-
209 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
210 See Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice
in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 886 (1982) (arguing for the admissibility of
character evidence of specific instances of prior conduct which "by [their] unusual na-
ture or... regular occurrence, can be fairly said to demonstrate a characterological pre-
disposition to behave in a similar fashion under similar circumstances.") (quoted in
Galvin, supra note 4, at 838 n.372).
211 "Modus operandi means, literally, 'method of working,' and refers to a pattern of
criminal behavior so distinctive that separate crimes are recongnizable as the handiwork
of the same wrongdoer." People v. Barbour, 436 N.E.2d 667 (Ill. App. 1982), quoted in
MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE § 404.5, at 194 (5th ed. 1990).
Illinois courts have allowed evidence of other crimes for many purposes other than
modus operandi, such as motive, see People v. McRae, 361 N.E.2d 685, 692 (Ill. App. 1977);
knowledge, see People v. Riley, 419 N.E.2d 106, 108 (Ill. App. 1981); intent, see People v.
Bartall, 456 N.E.2d 59, 66 (Ill. 1983); absence of mistake or accident, see People v. Leh-
man, 125 N.E.2d 506, 509 (Ill. 1955); defendant's state of mind, see People v. Hod-
denbach, 452 N.E.2d 32, 36 (Ill. App. 1983); absence of an innocent frame of mind or
the presence of criminal intent, see People v. McKibbins, 449 N.E.2d 821, 825 (Ill. App.
1983); circumstances or context of defendant's arrest, see Bartall, 456 N.E.2d at 66-67;
placement of defendant in proximity of the time and place of the crime, see People v.
Lewis, 450 N.E.2d 886, 894 (Ill. App. 1983); identification of the weapon used in the
crime, see People v. Carter, 232 N.E.2d 692, 697 (Ill. 1967); consciousness of guilt, see
People v. Baptist, 389 N.E.2d 1200, 1204 (Ill. 1979); that the crime charged was part of a
common design, scheme or plan of the defendant, see People v. Lehman, 125 N.E.2d at
129; circumstances of the crime charged that would otherwise be unclear, see People v.
Cole, 194 N.E.2d 269, 271 (Ill. 1963); and opportunity or preparation, see Wernowsky v.
Economy Fire & Gas Co., 477 N.E.2d 231, 233 (Ill. 1985), citing FED. R. EvID. § 404(b).
212 See Ordover, supra note 4, at 113; Berger, supra note 4, at 60.
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tity-that is, to place the defendant at the scene of the crime when
he denies having been present.2 13 By presenting evidence of similar
acts of sexual violence committed by the defendant in the past,
2 14
the prosecution seeks to establish that the defendant was indeed the
perpetrator of the sexual assault in question. 215 This evidence is not
admissible, however, for the purpose of implying that the defendant
committed the alleged crime because he has committed similar sex-
ual assaults in the past.
2 16
The use of modus operandi evidence with regard to a complain-
ant's prior sexual conduct is highly suspect. In a sexual assault case
where consent is the disputed issue, the defense has no need to es-
tablish the complainant's identity; the complainant certainly admits
to being present during the alleged sexual assault. Similarly, in a
case where the defense alleged that the complainant consented to
sex, the prosecution would have no need to introduce modus operandi
evidence to establish the defendant's presence.
Unfortunately, the Illinois courts have distorted the use of mo-
dus operandi evidence in sexual assault cases. Besides its use to estab-
lish identity, Illinois courts have held that "evidence of a
defendant's modus operandi may be relevant ... also to the issue of
whether a crime was committed at all."2 17 An Illinois appellate court ex-
213 Galvin, supra note 4, at 834; see People v. Taylor, 506 N.E.2d 321 (Ill. App. 1987).
214 Evidence of a defendant's modus operandi is by no means a rare issue in sexual as-
sault cases, for a great number or rapists are recidivists. One study conducted on unin-
carcerated sex offenders found that the 126 offenders had committed a total of 907
sexual assaults, involving 882 different victims. The average number of different victims
per sex offender was seven. See Gene Abel, et al., Self-Reported Sex Crimes of Nonincarcerated
Paraphiliacs, J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE, 2 at 3-25, cited in Rape in America, supra note 14,
at 6.
215 See Galvin, supra note 4, at 834. For cases of sex crimes where evidence of the
defendant's modus operandi was admitted, see People v. Velasco, 575 N.E.2d 954 (Ill. App.
1991); People v. Clauson, 537 N.E.2d 1048 (Ill. App. 1989); People v. Partin, 509
N.E.2d 662 (Ill. App. 1987); People v. Taylor, 506 N.E.2d 321 (Ill. App. 1987); People v.
Kimbrough, 485 N.E.2d 1292 (Il. App. 1985); People v. Fuller, 454 N.E.2d 334 (Ill.
App. 1983); People v. Osborn, 368 N.E.2d 608 (Ill. App. 1977).
216 See elasco, 575 N.E.2d 954, 962 ("[t]he law distrusts the inference that because a
person committed other crimes, he is more likely to have committed the crime
charged.").
217 People v. Middleton, 350 N.E.2d 223, 228 (Il. App. 1978) (emphasis added). For
other cases of sex crimes where evidence of the defendant's modus operandi was admissi-
ble, see, e.g., People v. Brown, 574 Ill. N.E.2d 190 (Ill. App. 1991) (defendant's pattern of
accosting women on street, offering them an interview for job and sexually assaulting
them at the meeting, admissible as evidence of defendant's modus operandi); Taylor, 506
N.E.2d 321 (defendant teacher's similar acts of sexual abuse against students admissible
to show modus operandi); People v. Kimbrough, 485 N.E.2d 1292 (defendant's pattern of
asking victims at college to accompany him to basement to enroll for purported gymnas-
tics class in order to sexually assault them admissible as evidence of modus operandi);
Fuller, 454 N.E.2d at 342 (defendants' practice of advertising in newspaper for fictitious
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plained that modus operandi evidence to show whether a crime was
committed at all is probative in sexual assault cases against the de-
fendant "where defendant contends that as between himself and the
victim, 'the question was did they meet by mutual consent or only by
threat of force.' "218 Thus, despite dicta to the contrary,2 19 Illinois
courts admit modus operandi evidence in sexual assault cases, where
consent is the disputed issue, to establish the defendant's propen-
sity to commit sexual assault. By examining the defendant's prior
acts of sexual violence, the fact finder will determine whether the
complainant consented to sexual relations with the defendant-that
is, "whether a crime was committed at all." 220
This use of the propensity inference is consistent with the thesis
of this comment, as it does not rely on inferences relating to a com-
plainant's consent based on the complainant's prior activity; rather, it
bases the likelihood of consent on the defendant's past acts. Despite
its consistency with this comment's thesis, however, this use of modus
operandi evidence violates the prohibition of propensity evidence in
Illinois law22 1 and should be excluded.
It is outside the scope of this comment to argue for legislative
action to correct this improper use of modus operandi evidence. Nor
will this comment address the argument, put forth by one scholar,
that if the use of prior acts may be offered to establish a defendant's
pattern of committing sexual assault, then fairness mandates that
the constitutionally protected defendant be permitted to similarly
introduce evidence of a complainant's pattern of consent.222 This
job and sexually assaulting victims who responded by going to defendants' home admis-
sible to show modus operandi); Middleton, 350 N.E.2d at 228 (defendant physician's pattern
of sexually assaulting patients admissible as defendant's modus operandi).
For examples of cases where modus operandi evidence was excluded, see Velasco, 575
N.E.2d 954 (where defendant was charged with molesting his 3 1-year-old stepdaughter,
afflicted with Down's Syndrome, evidence that defendant had previously molested 10-
and 13-year-old girls did not establish a modus operandi); People v. Barbour, 436 N.E.2d
667 (Ill. App. 1982) (where defendant was alleged to have sexually assaulted complain-
ant in his car, evidence that defendant had previously sexually attacked two women in
apartments was insufficient to establish a modus operandi).
218 Kimbrough, 485 N.E.2d at 1298 (emphasis added).
219 See, e.g., Velasco, 575 N.E.2d at 962 ("[t]he law distrusts the inference that because a
person committed other crimes, he is more likely to have committed the crime
charged"); Kimbrough, 485 N.E.2d at 1295 ("Evidence of other crimes or wrongful con-
duct is not admissible to show the defendant's character or propensity to commit crime
or wrongful acts. Where evidence has no value beyond the inference that the defendant
has a propensity for the crime charged, the evidence is excluded . .
220 Kimbrough, 485 N.E.2d at 1298.
221 See People v. Romero, 362 N.E.2d 288, 290 (Ill. 1977); People v. Velasco, 575
N.E.2d 954, 962 (Ill. App. 1991). See also supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
222 Galvin, supra note 4, at 835; see People v. Dawsey, 257 N.W.2d 236, 246 (Mich.
App. 1977) (Kaufman, J., dissenting) ("[ilt is difficult to conceive of a reason why a de-
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comment limits itself to rejecting any evidence of a complainant's
sexual history that relies on propensity.
Evidence of a complainant's prior sexual conduct, when offered
to demonstrate a pattern of sexual activity that is consistent with
consent to the alleged sexual assault, relies on the propensity infer-
ence. Thus, the Illinois rape shield statute's prohibition of this evi-
dence is warranted.
IV. PROPOSED STATUTE
The Illinois legislature should amend the Illinois rape shield
statute to reflect the modifications advocated in this comment. The
proposed rape shield statute would read as follows:
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, para. 115-7 (1991)
115-7. Prior sexual activity or reputation as evidence
§ 115-7. (a) In prosecutions for aggravated criminal sexual as-
sault, criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual abuse or
criminal sexual abuse, the prior sexual activity or the reputation of
the alleged victim's sexual history is inadmissible as evidence. The
following exceptions to this rule will apply, subject to the limitations
discussed in part (b) of this statute:
(1) The court must admit evidence concerning the past sexual
conduct of the alleged victim with the accused.
(2) The court must admit evidence concerning the past sexual
conduct of the alleged victim to prove that the accused did not cause
the complainant's physical conditions allegedly resulting from the
sexual assault. Alternatively, the court could admit a stipulation, if
offered by the prosecution and defense, that the accused did not
cause the complainant's physical condition. Such conditions may in-
clude, but are not limited to,
a) the presence of semen, blood, saliva or hair in the complain-
ant's vagina following the alleged sexual assault;
b) the alleged victim's pregnancy, if the alleged victim is preg-
nant at the time of trial;
c) the alleged victim's sexually transmitted disease, contracted
following the alleged sexual assault.
(3) The court must admit evidence concerning the past sexual
conduct of the alleged victim to show the alleged victim's bias or
motive to falsely accuse the defendant.
(4) The court may, in its discretion, admit evidence concern-
fendant's sexual history should be treated differently than that of complainant's."),
quoted in Galvin, supra note 4, at 838-39.
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ing the past sexual conduct of the alleged victim to explain the
source of the complainant's knowledge of sexual acts in cases where
the alleged victim is legally incapable of giving consent. If the ac-
cused seeks to introduce this evidence to prove that the complainant
is deliberately fabricating sexual offense charges, the accused must
also offer proof of the complainant's motive to lie.
(5) The court must admit evidence, in the form of past sexual
conduct of the alleged victim or otherwise, to demonstrate that the
alleged victim's sexual orientation is inconsistent with consent to
the alleged sexual assault.
(6) The court must admit evidence concerning the past sexual
conduct of the alleged victim to rebut evidence put forth by the
prosecution of the alleged victim's sexual orientation under section
(5).
(7) The court must admit evidence concerning the alleged vic-
tim's general reputation for committing prostitution to show that
the encounter that is the basis for the charge at issue was, itself, an
act of prostitution.
(b) No evidence admissible under this Section shall be intro-
duced unless ruled admissible by the trial judge after an offer of
proof has been made at a hearing to be held in camera. Such offer of
proof shall include reasonably specific information as to the date,
time and place of the past sexual conduct. Unless the court finds
that reasonably specific information as to date, time or place, or
some combination thereof, has been offered as to the alleged vic-
tim's prior sexual activity, the moving party shall be ordered to re-
frain from inquiring into the prior sexual activity.
V. CONCLUSION
Rape shield legislation has significantly curbed the often-brutal
treatment complainants received at the hands of zealous defense
counsel. Nevertheless, as the Illinois rape shield statute enters its
fourteenth year in existence, it has become clear that several pur-
poses exist that require evidence of the alleged victim's past sexual
behavior. Other "purposes," however, represent nothing more
than thinly veiled attempts to sneak propensity evidence back into
the courtroom.
In order to distinguish between valid and invalid uses of past
sexual conduct evidence, the legal system must acknowledge the evil
sought to be eradicated by the general prohibition of this evidence.
The law must invalidate the theory that a woman's past sexual be-
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havior is indicative of her likelihood to consent to sexual activity
with the defendant. The only way the law can reject the propensity
inference is to deny it whenever it arises, whether offered to suggest
the complainant's consent or non-consent. Anything less than a
consistent application of this principle will distort the truth-finding
process and continue to propagate unreliable myths about women.
DAVID ELLIS
